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ABSTRACT
This thesis uses ecofeminist and human-animal studies lenses to explore human animal
and nonhuman animal relations in early America. Most ecocritical studies of American literature
begin with nineteenth-century writers. This project, however, suggests that drawing on
ecofeminist theories with a human-animal studies approach sheds light on eighteenth-century
texts as well. Early American naturalist travel writing offers a site replete with human and
nonhuman encounters. Specifically, naturalist William Bartram’s travel journal features
interactions with animals in the southern colonial American frontier. Amateur naturalist
Elizabeth House Trist’s travel diary includes interactions with frontier and domestic animals.
Sarah Trimmer’s Fabulous Histories, a conduct manual that taught children acceptable behavior
towards animals, provides insight about the social regulation of human and nonhuman
relationships during the late eighteenth century, when Bartram and Trist wrote their texts.
This thesis identifies and analyzes textual sites that blur the human subject/and animal
object distinction and raise questions about the representation of animals as objects. This project
focuses on the subtle discursive subversions of early Euroamerican naturalist science present in
Bartram’s Travels (1791) and the blurring of human/animal boundaries in Trist’s Travel Diary
(1783-84); Trimmer’s Fabulous Histories (1794) further complicates the Euroamerican
discourse of animals as curiosities. These texts form part of a larger but overlooked discourse in
early British America that anticipated more well-known and nonhuman-centric texts in the
burgeoning early nineteenth-century American animal rights movement.
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CHAPTER ONE: WHEN ECOFEMINIST THEORY AND HUMANANIMAL STUDIES MEET EARLY AMERICA
Statement of Purpose

This thesis uses ecofeminist and human-animal studies lenses to explore human animal and
nonhuman animal relations in early Euroamerican travel writing and a British children’s conduct
manual published in early America.1 Most ecocritical studies of American literature begin with
nineteenth-century writers. However, this study of naturalist William Bartram’s travel journal,
amateur naturalist Elizabeth House Trist’s travel diary, and Sarah Trimmer’s conduct manual
suggests that ecofeminist and human-animal studies lenses illuminate eighteenth-century texts as
well. 2
Focusing on Trist’s and Bartram’s narration of human and nonhuman relationships, I
demonstrate that ecofeminist theories in conjunction with a human-animal studies approach
enable a more nuanced understanding of the complexity of early American human and
nonhuman interactions. I use these lenses to better understand the subtle subversion of the
discourses of curiosity in Trimmer’s Fabulous Histories (1794), and the blurring of the
human/animal binary in Bartram’s Travels (1791) and Trist’s Travel Diary (1783-84).
1

Although for the sake of space and ease of reading I use the words “human,” and “animal,” I do not endorse the
idea that humans are separate from or superior to animals; I do acknowledge the importance of recognizing and
respecting human and animal difference. I invoke the condition of humanimality (acknowledging that humans are
animals and are kin to nonhuman animals) by using the terms “human animal” and “nonhuman animal.” Carrie
Packwood Freeman stresses the importance of these terms because they acknowledge human and animal kinship and
imply that humans are not superior to animals (11-15).
2
Scholars have used the term “animal studies” in the past to mean scholarship descendent from cultural studies that
considers “the question of the animal,” or investigates the manner in which human and animal difference (or
similarity) is constructed by culture (Wolfe 564-67). Carol Freeman and Elizabeth Leane, however, offer a more
recent and encompassing definition of this field that implies the interdisciplinary nature of the field and scrutiny of
human and nonhuman bonding, communication, and interaction (2-3). I use Freeman’s and Leane’s term “humananimal studies” because it more accurately describes the approach of this project.

1

A Productive Merger: Ecofeminism, Human-Animal Studies, and Early American Texts

Scholars neglect to examine the human/animal binary in eighteenth-century
Euroamerican texts. 3 I scrutinize the human/animal binary in these texts as a way to unpack the
ecofeminist concerns and animal advocacy occurring in the narration. Seeing subjects in
nonhuman nature leads to greater respect and understanding of those nonhumans; however, early
American texts often portrayed animals as curious objects for amusement, objects for scientific
study, or as natural resources. By looking at nonhuman subjectivity with an ecofeminist and
human-animal studies lens we can see that Trimmer’s text advocates against seeing animals as
objects of amusement, while Bartram’s text presents frontier animals as unique individuals with
agency, and Trist’s text illustrates movement towards companion species bonding with an animal
trained for labor. These examples show that early Euroamerican texts did counter dominant
cultural discourses about animals even more so than the degree that the majority of American
ecocritical studies might suggest. In fact, these examples from eighteenth-century American texts
present nonhumans as subjects, a representation that blurs the human/animal binary, and can lead
to animal advocacy. Although the first American branch of the Society for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals was not founded until 1866, animal advocacy was present to some degree in
early America, as this reading of Bartram, Trist, and Trimmer will reveal (SPCA International).
Reflecting on moments where animals are viewed as subjects, we might ask why these

3

The human/animal boundary is based on the concept that humans are not animals and may be used to justify a
range of human practices with animals, including eating or abusing them (Carrie Packwood Freeman 11). The term
human/animal binary refers to the same concept as human/animal boundary but also stresses the fact that the
“animal” is reduced by this relationship and invokes Donna J. Haraway’s discussion of binaries that should be
blurred or “confused” in order to end the reduction of the lesser part of the binary (Symians). I also use “humananimal” to indicate an equal and interdependent relationship between humans and animals that the term
“human/animal” excludes.

2

alternative discourses from the past are still minority voices today. By noticing these moments
we encounter a new paradigm from which to approach animals in early American nature writing,
which scholars may use to identify early Euroamerican animal advocacy and use as a beginning
from which to reimagine more sustainable and respectful models for interacting with animals in
contemporary America.
Finding ways to see nonhumans as fellow subjects and understanding how our nation
succeeded or failed in this endeavor is integral to discovering ways to live sustainably today with
nonhumans. Because nature is still viewed as an economic resource even in contemporary
America, animals are likewise viewed with the colonial mindset that, according to Timothy
Sweet, plagues how contemporary Americans relate to nature. Sweet and Daniel Philippon
recently argued that ecocritical examinations of early American texts can be rich and productive.
Sweet’s discussion of the American eco-economy locates in modern American life the
persistence of our colonial mindset and its unsustainability (424-25). In response to Sweet,
Philippon explains that the humanities—including studies of early American literature—are
equally important to the ecocritical cause as the sciences. Philippon reasons that because human
behaviors and beliefs are the root of damage to the environment, exposing and altering these
damaging behaviors will improve the global environment (430-33). I agree that this theoretical
angle can identify unsustainable early American attitudes and practices. Moreover, I extend
Sweet’s and Philippon’s arguments to include ecofeminist theory and human-animal studies
tenets. Studying the manner in which these early Euroamerican texts countered the colonial
Enlightenment mentality, which endorses and promulgates anthropocentric thought, provides a
template from which to understand and counter the lingering effects of these paradigms.

3

Discourses of curiosity, colonialism, and early Euroamerican natural science inform the
representation of animals as objects in eighteenth-century Euroamerica. A “curious” person
investigated, catalogued, and kept specimens of interesting plants and animals (or “curiosities”)
for study in the pursuit of knowledge; this definition also implied that a British man was most
adept to observe and collect this knowledge (Parrish 63-67). Early American naturalist gathering
and cataloguing methods were based on British botanical models, which looked toward
Enlightenment theory for the conception that animals are lesser beings (Lewis 68). Naturalist
methods of observation encouraged the objectification of nonhumans by simplifying categories,
descriptions, and behaviors of animals. Western thought has relied on hierarchical categories to
understand human and animal relations, which precludes acknowledging kinship among species
(Bell 164). For example, the Chain of Being theory called for ranking all beings in a hierarchy
with no possibility of blurring distinctions between species or the order of the hierarchy. The
Linnaean classification system and Linnaean drawing method also placed nonhumans in
definitive categories and left little room for descriptions of behavior, habitat, or interaction with
other species (Magee 151-52). While early American naturalist methods promoted the
objectification of animals because of the link with Enlightenment thought, objectification also
occurred because naturalist agendas were often directed by British and later American colonial
imperatives, which included appropriating nonhuman nature for national economic or
philosophical benefit. Early American naturalists who gathered specimens also participated in
nation-building practices and used cataloging to appropriate the natural resources of the new
nation as wealth (Lewis 69-75).

4

One key ingredient in my approach to how early Euroamerican texts promote nonhumans
as subjects instead of objects is the ecofeminist assumption that all living beings exist
interdependently, thereby making each being equally important to the survival of all beings. The
common mission of ecofeminists is to end the reduction of women and nature while learning to
view all beings in nature as equally valuable (Gates 21). One set of shared beliefs underpins
ecofeminist texts:
[T]he necessity for social transformation by moving beyond power politics and an
equivalent necessity for less ‘management’ of the land. . . . They also include an
appreciation for the intrinsic value of everything in nature—a biocentric rather
than an anthropocentric viewpoint; an end to dualisms like male/female,
thought/action, and spiritual/natural; and a trust in process, not just product.
(Gates 21)
This project acknowledges that these dichotomies and hierarchies are deeply rooted in American
culture, partially because of the influence of these colonial and Enlightenment discourses, and
require a multi-disciplinary dismantling to dispel them. This project also unpacks the
“naturalness” of what counts as “natural” in human and animal relations. That is, naturalist
science entailed more than simply recording and classifying because to record and classify
entails a system; I examine the system itself by looking at how animals are made visible as
individual beings (or not) in the eyes of the observer. Trimmer’s conduct manual provides a basis
for identifying diversions from assumed “natural” eighteenth-century human and animal
interactions.

5

That which we otherwise take for granted or as “natural” can also be analyzed
productively through a human-animal studies lens. Human-animal studies discourses intervene in
dominant cultural representations of animals, which draw on Enlightenment and Judeo-Christian
thought. With the help of this framework I can “re-see” the relationships depicted in early British
American texts that draw on naturalist and travel discourses. The Enlightenment period,
(featuring philosophers such as Descartes and Kant) although brief, stands as “the formative one
for our prevailing intellectual, political, and juridical institutions” (Wolfe 564). While posthumanist thinkers acknowledge that the human/animal binary harms all beings by reducing
animals and creating a false separation of humans and animals, the Enlightenment belief in this
false divide remains pervasive in current ideology. In general, human-animal studies scholars
argue against viewing animals as diminished, lesser, or incomplete humans; they also recognize
animals as agents of their own free will who speak, communicate, and gain wisdom through
bodily experiences (Freeman 24-29). A recurring objective throughout human-animal studies
scholarship is to ponder “the question of the animal” in society and culture. More recently, the
mission of this interdisciplinary field includes investigating human and animal relations, bonds,
and interspecies communication (Freeman and Leane 2-3). In short, “a human-animal studies
scholar reflects on, as well as describes, the ‘limitations and complexities’ of these relationships”
(Ken Shapiro qtd. in Freeman and Leane 3). The territory of human-animal studies remains
difficult to define because it reaches to any text that includes animals (Wolfe 565). Although
eighteenth-century American human and animal relations, communication, and bonds exist
within the broad purview of human-animal studies, these texts remain mostly unexplored. I
therefore focus on when these texts blur the human/animal boundary, study if and how humans

6

and nonhumans communicate, and identify when interspecies bonding occurs. All of these
actions can signal a movement away from seeing nonhumans as objects and towards viewing
them as subjects with agency.
In the selected texts in this thesis, I examine passages that narrate human recognition of
animal suffering and death, a turn that anticipates sympathy and understanding of these animals
as fellow subjects. In early Euroamerican colonial and naturalist texts, animals were usually
presented as objects. According to twenty-first-century human-animal studies thinkers,
objectifying nonhumans precludes sympathy and leads to harmful, unsustainable behavior
towards all beings.4 Human lack of sympathy for animals relates to an inability to acknowledge
their suffering and death for the benefit of humans. Some scholars believe the solution is for
humans to exhibit a feminist ethics of care and re-learn sympathy for animals in order to
recognize and stop horrific abuse of nonhumans (Donovan 294). Human-animal thinkers explain
the distinct category of “human” as a harmful cultural fabrication because it opens the way for
abuse; that is, the term “animal” itself may contradict the “humane” (The Sexual Politics of
Meat, 168-71). In essence, ecofeminist and human-animal thinkers argue that the category of
“animal” also implies objectification by humans. For Carol J. Adams, Josephine Donovan, and
Victoria Johnson, this viewpoint damages humans and nonhumans by creating a relationship of
power that also invites abuse.

4

Twenty-first-century sympathy should not be confused with Adam Smith’s eighteenth-century notion of sympathy,
which operates more like contemporary empathy; it entails a spectator imagining themselves in the position of
another and determining if s/he would react to the situation with the same emotions. If the observer determines that
s/he would share the emotions of the other person given their situation, then the observer sympathizes with the other
person. Smith claims that, for humans, sharing mutual emotions (positive or negative) brings pleasure, intensifies
happiness, or eases sadness (Smith).

7

Human-animal studies ultimately offers a lens to accomplish the main objective of this
thesis: a framework through which to track the textual resistance to, complication of, and even
dismantling of Euroamerican subjectivity defined by anthropocentricism and human and
nonhuman interactions. Rather than adopt a humanist definition of subjectivity, I use Patrick D.
Murphy’s anti-anthropocentric definition of subjectivity.5 Murphy defines subjectivity as the
ability to respond to another being with any type of semiotic exchange, even if this exchange
consists of “non-volitional utterances” or nonverbal engagement (“Subjects” 123-24). This
definition is essential to this project because it allows viewing nonhuman communication,
knowledge, and knowledge production as “speech,” which stands at the core of asserting agency,
and therefore, signaling subjectivity. Also wary of a humanist practice of human-animal studies,
I call upon Donna J. Haraway’s concept of companion species in order to interrogate hierarchical
notions of human and animal relationships. A “companion species” relationship, as Haraway
defines it, goes beyond a pet/owner or human/animal dichotomy because it features recognition
of all the ways that human and nonhuman bodies and minds intertwine to make us human
animals. This recognition then allows humans to see past the culturally constructed
human/animal binary, which leads to viewing animals as kin, thereby increasing human respect
for nonhumans and reducing abuse towards them (When Species Meet 16-19). This concept is
vital to this project because it provides an example of an alternative to the human/animal
hierarchy and aids in identifying moments in the selected texts that deviate from this eighteenthcentury cultural norm.

5

As Cary Wolfe explains, the attempt to simply grant nonhumans human subjectivity comes from a humanist
paradigm that still denies animals their inherent agency (572).

8

This project extends the work of ecocritical and ecofeminist scholars to track how animals
emerge as non-anthropocentric speaking subjects in Trist’s and Bartram’s travel journals. These
texts reveal a language of empathy and advocacy for nonhuman kin.6 Trimmer’s children’s
conduct manual serves as a backdrop, advancing a dichotomous relationship that may best
represent the views of general audiences. Adults of Bartram’s and Trist’s generation could likely
have read or presented Trimmer’s Fabulous Histories to their children. Trimmer’s conduct
manual inculcated lessons about a human/animal hierarchy even as it discouraged treating
animals as curious objects.
By viewing these three texts in conversation and through an ecofeminist/animal-centric
paradigm modern readers can identify disruptions in dominant cultural narratives about humans
and animals. If we attend to these moments of human and nonhuman connection and
understanding, we observe that human/animal hierarchies are no more “natural” to the eighteenth
century than they are today. Perhaps these moments from long ago can offer contemporary
scholars a starting point for theorizing early British American naturalist texts as ecocritical and
for developing more sustainable relationships with animals today. When readers and writers
recognize animals as subjects, they begin moving away from colonial interactions with animals
and toward acknowledgement of nonhuman animals as speaking subjects with their own diverse
and unique identities.

6

While eighteenth-century sympathy, to an extent, enables the animal advocacy in these texts, I plan to pursue this
connection in a later project because it is beyond the scope of this thesis.

9

CHAPTER TWO: TEACHING CHILDREN ABOUT “PROPER”
RELATIONSHIPS WITH NONHUMANS

British Colonial and Early American Conduct Instruction with Nonhumans
Sarah Trimmer’s children’s conduct manual, Fabulous Histories works within colonial,
Enlightenment, and scientific curiosity discourses while also subverting them. Generally,
Trimmer’s text endorses the Enlightenment human/animal hierarchy through anthropocentric
storytelling and the Christian belief in animal inferiority. Fabulous Histories, however, argues
against the practices of treating animals as curious objects for amusement and capturing animals
as scientific curiosities. The text, at times, counters the anthropocentric narration by recognizing
animals as subjects with their own desires, needs, and agency. This resonates with moments
within Travels and The Travel Diary of Elizabeth House Trist that reject an objective, colonial
naturalist view of animals. This children’s conduct manual also offers an interesting point of
comparison because adults from Trimmer’s and Bartram’s generation could have had access to
it. Essentially, examining Fabulous Histories alongside Travels and The Travel Diary offers
insight into what this generation of Euroamericans might have taught their children about how to
view animals. With the moments of animal advocacy weakened by Trimmer’s constant
reminders of animal inferiority, Fabulous Histories provides a solid contrast to Travels and The
Travel Diary, which contain animal advocacy or blur the human/animal binary without the
caveat of human superiority.
First published in London in 1786, the Fabulous Histories garnered a prolific
transatlantic audience and was read in Philadelphia (1794, 1795,1869) and Boston (1822, 1827,
10

1901) (WorldCat Database). In a biography of Trimmer’s life, published in 1817 in the New
York-based periodical Christian Register Moral and Theological Review, the biographer makes
it clear that Fabulous Histories was widely read by American children:
The intention of this little work [Fabulous Histories] was to give children proper
ideas of the treatment of animals; and, under the fictitious name of a Nest of
Robins, to inculcate lessons of domestic virtue. This book being in the hands of
most young people, it is unnecessary to say much respecting it; the reader will
doubtless allow it the merit of being ingenious and interesting, and of conveying
much useful instruction under a pleasing form. (“Biography” 10)
Americans could have bought or read Fabulous Histories to their children during the same
timeframe as when they read Bartram’s Travels—around 1794. Likewise, Trist’s diary was
written only ten years prior to Travels. It is clear from early American periodicals, where
Trimmer’s text was frequently listed for sale, that it found an American readership well into the
eighteenth century.7
In purchasing or sharing Fabulous Histories, early American parents endorsed the
content, which included recognizing animals as more than objects. By uncovering the many
degrees of animal subjectivity presented in early American texts (by this I mean texts written or
read in early America), we garner a more complete picture of early American views of
nonhumans. This examination of Fabulous Histories next to Bartram’s and Trist’s texts

7

In 1807, the Boston-based newspaper the Christian Observer lists the text for sale as two volumes bound featuring
“plates,” or illustrations (“List of New Publications” 193). The Philadelphia periodical the American Publishers’
Circular and Literary Gazette, lists Fabulous Histories for sale in 1856 as a book bound in paper-covered “boards,”
and measuring “18mo,” or eighteenmo, which would have been about 4 by 6.5 inches (“List of New Works” 42).
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demonstrates that some early American discourses entertained animal subjectivity in contrast to
the discourse of curiosity.
American Parents Buy Colonial Ideology
Trimmer, “the most saleable children’s author of her day,” is remembered in part for
developing the theory that children must read literature because it was “not only the key to
personal development, and by extension, to society’s future, but also, potentially . . . the
safeguard of the nation in a time of crisis” (Grenby 137, 156). Her children’s books were
intended to shape good British citizens, which also entailed thinking like good colonizers. This
colonizing world view in Fabulous Histories, which presents humans as the naturalized
managers of nature, makes her depiction of some animals as subjects even more subversive.
Trimmer’s books also promoted eighteenth-century Natural Theory, which posits that scientific
study reveals how God shaped nature as a part of divine design (Cosslett 17). Trimmer believed
that by examining animals and plants children would observe God’s will and design (17). Also,
through scientific observation children would better understand animals and be less likely to
harm them (19). Tess Cosslett explains how Trimmer often asked children “to think themselves
into the subjectivity of animals” in order to convince them to treat animals with kindness (18).
Fabulous Histories often uses this device to encourage children to be kind to animals. Fabulous
Histories came into print during a transitional period in children’s literature, “a development
from the rather static fable, in which each animal represents one emblematic quality, for the
purposes of social satire and moral advice, to stories that also give natural historical information,
plead for kindness to animals, and attempt to create animals as subjects as well as objects of
study and use to man” (30). Understanding why Fabulous Histories contains these sometimes
12

conflicting messages fails to weaken what the text ultimately conveys to readers—an alternate
paradigm through which to view animals as more than objects and deserving of respect.
Although Trimmer sought to reinforce human/animal hierarchical structures throughout
Fabulous Histories, the message of animal advocacy exudes a significant presence in the text. I
argue that the subversive view of animals in this text resonates strongly with Bartram’s and
Trist’s writings from a similar period in early America. Taken collectively, these texts could
indicate a trend in opposition to objectifying animals in the eighteenth-century transatlantic
culture of curiosity.
Why did American parents purchase a book that taught children to treat animals as lessthan-human but also to reject the idea that they were curious objects for amusement? American
naturalists appropriated British botanical methods, which resulted in a discourse that sought to
control and colonize a distinctly “American” nature (Lewis). This colonial paradigm, therefore,
may have resonated with Americans and made a suitable conduct manual for American children
because it reflected the paradoxes of early American naturalist discourse—which involved
viewing animals simultaneously as objects and subjects.

Defining Curiosity

Since the sixteenth century, British citizens viewed America as a site of knowledge
production and the source of undiscovered “curious” specimens of plants, minerals, and animals
(Parrish 8). The definition of curiosity in the seventeenth century was “associated with the
negative, credulous aspects of wonder” and used to define “an anomalous wonder” or childlike
“proclivity for questioning” (62-63). In the eighteenth century, however, curiosity shifted to
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signify “a new addition to an increasingly comprehensive and faithful catalogue of nature;” or “a
reliable, detailed, and exhaustive” observer of the natural world (63). The boxing and shipping of
these specimens and equating nonhuman nature with catalogued items linked “curiosity” to
objectification. A human hierarchy was also inherent in discourses of eighteenth-century
transatlantic curiosity. Curiosity was embodied by the affluent “English gentleman” examining
natural objects to produce knowledge (75). Essentially women, colonial men, slaves, and other
non-English were viewed as less than capable curious observers; however, colonial men and
women still used various rhetorical strategies to assure English audiences of their reliable natural
observations (75-76). Fabulous Histories, however, warns against both the seventeenth-century
concept of viewing nonhuman nature as full of curious objects of wonder and amusement, and
the eighteenth-century idea of capturing and cataloguing curious objects for knowledge
production. Instead, the narrator encourages observation of nonhumans in their natural
environments to avoid disturbing or harming them.

Damaging Anthropocentric Metaphors
By establishing how anthropocentric metaphors saturate Trimmer’s conduct manual and
generate unproductive confusions of the human/animal binary, I consider how Trimmer’s
contrasting passages function subversively. Anthropomorphism, more often than not, functions
to remove real animal needs and concerns and replace them with human ones; this naturalizes the
human/animal binary by forming a hierarchy of needs and privileges. As I explain in my
introduction, contemporary scholars argue that dominant ideologies still proclaim the “natural”
nature of the separation between human and animal and the human/animal hierarchy, which have
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roots in Enlightenment thought (Bell, Donovan, Freeman, Haraway, Sanbonmatsu). Many
scholars feel that the originators of the seventeenth-century European view of nature as a
mechanical object either created or confirmed “man” as the dominator of nature: they “turned
nature into the servant of men, into the distanced object that ensured his status as master”
(Parrish 43). Anthropomorphic animal figures that speak human morals only further this human
domination over animals. As Frank Palmeri notes, “animal fables are not about animals, but
rather transpose human social relations onto the animal world in order to narrate and comment
on human behavior” (83). Fabulous Histories follows this formula with an anthropomorphic
family of robins. Anthropocentric metaphors, such as those employed in Fabulous Histories,
deny the entangled relationship between humans and nonhumans and privilege human over
nonhuman needs. Animals studies scholar Karen Raber explains that “the problems of
anthropomorphism, anthrophocentrism, and speciesism, [are] the triumvirate of bad words for
what people do to animals when they talk about them” (99). She argues that anthropomorphizing
animals leads to anthropocentric thinking, which prioritizes humans over animals. Similarly,
Murphy points out that anthropocentrism keeps humans from this interspecies interdependence;
when humans force animals to wear our faces and mannerisms, nonhuman animals are obscured
by human desires and needs (Literature, Nature, and Other 52). Later, I explain the moments
where Fabulous Histories departs from this traditional anthropocentric fable formula and uses
animals to instead address issues of the human treatment of animals.
The story features a male and female robin who nest and hatch four eggs in the safe space
of a human family’s garden. Trimmer presents the robins as a human, heteronormative family
named the Redbreasts. The robins experience human problems, such as disobedient children. The
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parents teach their children that adults, especially the father, should be obeyed, thereby
establishing a patriarchal structure within the family. Essentially, the robins speak and act out
human concerns as a way to instruct young readers about human moral behavior and their place
in the metaphorical nest. The Redbreast family serves as an example of damaging
anthropocentrism which threatens to erase the nonhuman animal completely in favor of
naturalizing the myth of the separate and superior “human” life form. The robins are more than
an “animal” foil for “humanity,” however; they also function as tools to instruct children in the
workings of “human” patriarchal social structures and to teach them that animals rank below
them in this hierarchy. Essentially, the robins operate as devices for humans to understand their
own ideology.
Human gender and family roles are clearly defined to align with dominant culture. The
mother generally stays in the nest to care for the four children while the father leaves to search
for food and provide for his family. The father robin also “chose to leave the female part of his
family to the particular management of their mother” (92). This separates the roles of the mother
and father; the mother is responsible for the domestic private space, while the father searches for
food in the public space outside of the nest. The mother robin even yields to the father robin’s
authority, sometimes acting only after “having obtained her mate’s consent” (15).
As the robins speak with human voices and exhibit human social concerns, their actual
needs and the way real robins see the world is overshadowed by the human masks they wear as
the Redbreast family. The human voices that the robins use to teach human ideology to their
offspring eclipse the manner in which actual robins communicate. One main example of this
anthropocentric use of the robins to explain human ideology is when the parent robins teach their
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disobedient son (named Robin) that his parents have authority over him. Robin “failed to humble
himself to his father” by not accepting his father’s flying advice, which results in his fall to the
ground (92). After Robin is hurt, he realizes that he should have listened to his father’s advice
and delivers a monologue about obedience:
Oh! Cried he, that I had but followed the advice and example of my tender
parents, then had I been safe in the nest, blessed with their kind caresses, and
enjoying the company of my dear brother and sisters! But now I am of all birds,
the most wretched! . . . What kind beak will supply me with food to assuage the
pangs of hunger which I shall soon feel? . . . Who will protect me from the
various tribes of barbarous animals which I have been told make prey of birds?
(93)
In this excerpt, the home is portrayed as a “safe” place with “tender” parents that “protect” and
caress children (93). In contrast, existence away from home comes across as “wretched,” full of
“pangs of hunger,” and “barbarous animals” (93). This language equates obedience in the home
with protection, while portraying the natural world as a hazardous place without food or shelter
from ravenous animals. With this reasoning, nature comes across as the enemy of the domestic
family. This passage is one small piece of the larger text that follows the anthropomorphic
Redbreast family as they deal with human social structures, therefore, displacing the
representation of how actual robins live, think, speak or interact in nature. Anthropomorphic
metaphors and anthropocentric views of the world such as those in Fabulous Histories contribute
to the belief that humans are separate from and superior to animals. This line of thought only
leads humans to forget that nonhumans are also capable of thought, emotion, speech, and social
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interaction. Anthropocentric thinking also reinforces belief in the artificial human/animal
hierarchy by naturalizing it.
Through the human characters’ interactions, Fabulous Histories also directly endorses
the human/animal and domestic/wild binaries. The six-year-old boy named Frederick proposes to
take responsibility for the robin family in living in his garden by using his allowance to buy bird
feed: “O, said Frederick, I will give all the money I have in the world to buy victuals for my
dear, dear birds” (15). His expression of compassion towards the birds is countered by his
mother. She responds to this by quickly correcting him that he is “human” and should therefore
help his own kind before “inferior” animals:
[T]hough I commend your humanity, I must remind you again, that there are poor
people as well as poor birds. . . . I am delighted, my dear children, with your
humane behaviour towards the animal creation, and wish by all means to
encourage it. But though a most commendable propensity, it requires regulation;
let me therefore recommend to you, not to suffer it, to gain upon you to such a
degree, as to make you unhappy or forgetful of those, who have a superior claim
to your attention: I mean poor people; always keep in mind the distresses which
they endure, and on no account waste any kind of food, nor give to inferior
animals what is designed for mankind. (15-16)
Here, the animal presence of the robins acts as a foil to construct the humanity of young
Frederick. The authority figure of the mother reaffirms that humans are “superior” to the birds
and deserve to be cared for before “inferior animals” (15). Frederick’s mother instructs him to
“regulate” his “humanity” and not “waste” food “designed for mankind” (16). What is missing in
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this line of reasoning is that birds do not need human care or food to survive in nature. The
mother speaks in this passage as if sustenance only exists in the human-made home and never
acknowledges that birds survive in the wild without human help. This reinforces the
Enlightenment belief in a human-dominated hierarchy over animals. It even naturalizes the idea
of a safer human domestic space over “animalized” nature.

Children, Respect the Animals

In contrast with the anthropomorphic presentation of the robins, the text speaks against
treating animals as curiosities for amusement and objectifying animals to justify violence against
nonhumans. The text also encourages observing animals in their natural environment instead of
as captured objects. Immediately after the anthropomorphic robin passage, Fredrick’s mother
demands he respect a butterfly trapped in his home and release it into its natural environment.
Despite being juxtaposed with the anthropomorphic portrayal of the robins, this butterfly
encounter argues for adults to teach children to respect insects as subjects with agency. The
butterfly passage differs from the robin passage because Frederick’s mother instructs him to
leave the butterfly alone. The mother makes it clear that treating the butterfly as a play-thing will
lead to harming it: “This [butterfly] Frederick was very desirous of catching, but his mamma
would not permit him to attempt it; because (she told him) he could not well lay hold of its wings
without doing it an injury, and it would be much happier at liberty” (16). The butterfly’s wellbeing is more important than Frederick’s desire to catch the butterfly for his amusement. This
contrasts with the anthropomorphic presentation of the robins that conflates actual bird needs
with human needs. Frederick’s mother recognizes and explains the butterfly’s needs to Frederick.
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She also encourages him to imagine himself in the insect’s place: “Should you like, Frederick,
said she, when you are going out to play, to have any body lay hold on you violently, scratch you
all over, then offer you something to eat which is very disagreeable, and perhaps poisonous, and
then shut you up in a little dark room?” (16-17). The text leads young readers to place
themselves in the captured butterfly’s position. This passage demonstrates how to respect the
butterfly by putting the insect’s needs before the child’s desire to be entertained. It also sends the
message that capturing any insects as curious objects harms them. After Frederick imagines
himself in the position of the butterfly, he asks his mother to let it outside and she instructs her
children to open a window to release it.
The narrator describes the butterfly’s reaction to the open window in a manner that shows
recognition of its individual subjectivity: “the happy insect seized the opportunity of escaping,
and Frederick had soon the pleasure of seeing it on a rose-tree” (17). The butterfly reacts to the
open window by flying outside, thereby demonstrating his individual agency. Frederick
continues to observe the butterfly in the garden and his spirits are lifted in reaction to the
butterfly’s behavior: “Frederick, during his walk, amused himself with watching the Butterfly, as
it flew from flower to flower which gave more pleasure than he could possibly have received
from catching and confining the little tender creature” (17). Frederick’s happiness with watching
the liberated butterfly exercise its agency in a natural environment shows readers how mutual
respect benefits all beings involved and promotes observing nonhumans in their natural
environments instead of as caged or captured curious objects. This entire butterfly vignette
conveys the message that humans should resist any desire to capture, or confine nonhumans as
objects for human study or amusement—a theme that continues throughout the text. While
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young readers can empathize with Frederick, mothers reading this to their children may also gain
strategies for preventing their children from capturing and harming insects. This passage acts as
one of the strongest examples of the presence of this counter-discourse because most of the
examples feature a reminder that God made humans superior to animals.
Trimmer clarifies this viewpoint in the advertisement in the front matter of the book;
while “Christian Benevolence” entails being compassionate to animals, “immoderate tenderness .
. . towards those, over whom the SUPREME GOVENOR hath given them dominion” is incorrect
(vi). Although these instances of animal advocacy are qualified by the Christian belief that God
made humans naturally superior guardians of nonhumans, something other than mere
objectification or anthropocentric thinking occurs. Trimmer links “immoderate tenderness”
towards animals to animal-hoarding behavior, which ultimately leads to the neglect of humans
and nonhumans alike. Again, seeing animals as objects for amusement is presented as the
gateway to harming humans and nonhumans.
Mrs. Addis, a family friend, keeps a strange menagerie of animals in her drawing room,
including “a parrot, a paroquet, and a macaw, all in most elegant cages . . . a squirrel and a
monkey, which had each a little house neatly ornamented . . . a lapdog lying on a splendid
cushion; and in a beautiful little cradle . . . a cat with a litter of kittens” (97-98). This excerpt
shows how Mrs. Addis displays and keeps these animals as curious objects for human
amusement. She keeps the exotic animals chained and caged in her house and fails to respect
their individual needs. Mrs. Addis’s children are also neglected in this arrangement; she keeps
her boy in boarding school only to keep him away from her animals. She also spends her time
and money on her animals instead of dressing her daughter or socializing her: “Mrs. Benson was
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quite shocked to see how sickly, dirty, and ragged this child was, and what a very vulgar figure
she made, for want of instruction” (100). This definition of “immoderate tenderness” suggests
that keeping animals as ornamental objects in such a manner interferes with human ability to
operate productively in human society. It also portrays the harm done to animals when their
distinct needs are ignored in favor of human desires. Despite warning about being too fond of
animals and reinforcing the belief in human superiority, the text still advocates for the rights of
nonhumans in specific passages that function to model a relationship of mutual respect, which
counters the discourse of animals as curious objects.
When Frederick expresses his desire to cage the robins in the garden that he feeds, his
mother explains that caging birds for human pleasure only harms birds. The same tactic that was
used with the butterfly is employed here. Frederick’s mother asks him to imagine himself in the
position of the birds to determine if keeping birds in captivity would be wrong: “And would you
really confine these sweet creatures in a cage, Frederick, merely to have the pleasure of looking
at them? Should you like to be always shut up in a little room?” (35). The mother explains that
birds experience similar emotions to those of humans, which is a powerful statement, even
though she qualifies it by saying they are lesser beings: “Though these little animals are inferior
to you, there is no doubt but they are capable of enjoyments similar to these [human pleasures];
and it must be a dreadful life for a poor bird to be shut up in a cage, where he cannot so much as
make use of his wings—where he is excluded from his natural companions” (36). The statement
that birds remain inferior, along with acknowledgement of a hierarchy where the birds play with
“natural companions,” authorizes the call for compassion towards animals, recognition of their
needs, and acceptance of animal emotions.
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As with the butterfly and the robins, Frederick’s mother explains that keeping song birds
in cages for human amusement is wrong because it hurts them. She describes her rescue of a pet
canary that was released into the wild because the owner did not like the way it sang. She finds
the canary unused to English weather and abused by native birds: “I could not help fancying the
little creature to be like a foreigner just landed from some distant country, followed by a rude
rabble of boys” (37). Where her neighbor disposed of the canary simply because its song failed
to please, Frederick’s mother demonstrates a keen awareness of the bird’s needs by comparing it
to a human stranger who needs her help. Much like the crying, child-like bear in Bartram’s
Travels (examined in chapter three of this thesis), Trimmer’s anthropomorphic description of the
bird acts as a device to elevate its status from that of a broken object of amusement to a fellow
subject in need. She provides the bird with a large cage in her warm home, procures a mate for
company, and eventually bestows the canaries and their offspring on a friend with an aviary.
Frederick’s mother further explains that she keeps larks to save them from being eaten:
“Quantities of them are killed and sold for the spit . . . I frequently buy them, as you know,
Harriet, but as soon as the fine weather returns, I constantly set them at liberty” (38). Like the
narrator in Travels, examined later in chapter three, these characters model for readers how
keeping nonhumans, such as birds and insects, as objects of amusement only harms nonhumans.
The text also describes how keeping animals as public curiosities hurts them. The
mother’s explanation of the Learned Pig in London, who spells words by choosing letters on
cards, argues against using animals as public scientific curiosities: “I would advise you, Harriet,
never to give countenance to those people who shew what they call learned animals; as you may
assure yourself they exercise great barbarities upon them, of which starving them almost to death
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is most likely among the number” (72). The mother tells her daughter never to view animals
performing for public amusement because they only perform after suffering “great barbarities” at
human hands.
Frederick and his sister Harriet’s discussion with their playmate Edward Jenkins
illustrates how young readers might put the animal advocacy that Trimmer describes into action.
Edward suggests that “it would have been a nice diversion to you to toss the young birds [the
robins that live in Frederick’s garden] about” (58). He boasts to Frederick and Harriet that he
collected at least a hundred bird’s eggs from nests: “I blow out the inside, and then run a thread
through them, and give them to Lucy [his sister] to hang up amongst her curiosities, and very
pretty they look, I assure you” (58). Harriet’s response to Edward echoes the teachings of her
mother by asking if he would: “rather see a parcel of empty egg-shells, than hear a sweet concert
of birds singing in the trees?” (58). Harriett’s words devalue the eggs as objects in favor of
hearing wild birds’ sing. This response calls for valuing birds in their natural environment
instead of draining the eggs to decorating human homes.
Fabulous Histories advocates for the subjectivity of domestic as well as “wild” animals
by arguing that seeing animals as objects leads to violence against them. The neighbor Edward
embodies this idea. Edward tries to tie Harriet’s dog and cat together to watch them fight. While
Frederick and Harriet convince Edward to leave the pets alone, he explains that he enjoys
throwing cats off of roofs for fun: “[W]e tied bladders to each side of their necks, and then flung
them from the top of the house. There was an end of their purring and mewing for some time, I
assure you, for they lay a long while struggling and gasping for breath . . . but at last up they
jumped, and away ran scampering” (62-63). Edward describes violence to several animals. He
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convinces strangers to beat and shoot to death a neighbor’s dog whom he characterizes as a mad
dog, drowns puppies in front of their mother, makes cocks fight each other until they are cut and
blinded, and plucks a live chicken. Edward demonstrates how naturalizing animal inferiority and
denying nonhuman feeling and emotions is a slippery slope toward rationalizing violence against
nonhumans. Edward explains to Harriet that he has a right to use animals as he pleases for his
amusement because they cannot feel: “why have we not a right to do as we please to dogs and
cats, or do you think they feel as we do? [emphasis original]” (63).
Although the call to respect nonhumans remains qualified by the Christian belief that
humans are superior to animals and is folded into the anthropocentric morality tale of the
Redbreast robin family, Fabulous Histories also moves toward a more mutually respectful
relationship between humans and nonhumans that counters the discourse of animals as
curiosities. The text presents Edward, Mrs. Addis, and the trainers of the Learned Pig as
examples of how seeing wild and domestic animals as objects for amusement may easily lead to
violence against them. Even though the butterfly’s response to the open window stands as one of
the few examples of an animal expressing his/her agency through a responsive movement in
Fabulous Histories, Trimmer’s text proclaims animals as beings with needs and desires
independent of humanity in the interactions between Mrs. Benson, her children, and her animals.
The examples from Bartram’s and Trist’s texts, which omit outright statements of “human
superiority,” appear as even stronger arguments for animals as subjects against the backdrop of
the anthropocentric and Trimmer’s text.
Aaron Bell argues that as long as compassion and respect for nonhumans is couched in
anthropocentric thinking, such as that espoused by Enlightenment theories and religions that
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naturalize human superiority, humans will continue to rationalize violence against beings
considered less-than-human:
If we are finally to abandon the self-aggrandizing narrative of anthropocentricism
constructed in the West, we will have to begin by reconceptualizing the difference
between humans and animals in a way that does not operate under a destructive
exclusionary logic. Both for human beings and for animals, any cession of
violence under the current logic is only a momentary deferment . . . Even
moments of apparent tenderness and compassion become grotesque symptoms of
a corrupted order so long as this way of life is permitted to stand. (174)
In the context of this argument, the moments of compassion in Trimmer’s manual are corrupted
by the discussion of animal inferiority. Travels and The Travel Diary, however, lack this blatant
exclusionary logic and instead model steps to move toward reconceptualizing human and
nonhuman relationships—making these and similarly subversive early American texts vital for
fertilizing the discussion of how to move forward as a nation and plant the seeds to reimagine a
healthier relationship with nonhumans.
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CHAPTER THREE: LISTENING TO THE NONHUMAN OTHER
An Ecocritical/Human-Animal Studies Reexamination of William Bartram’s Travels

The evening was temperately cool and calm. The crocodiles began to roar and appear in
uncommon numbers along the shores and in the river. I fixed my camp in an open plain . . .
I had free prospect of the river, which was a matter of no trivial consideration to me having
good reason to dread the subtle attacks of the allegators, who were crowding about my
harbour . . .
William Bartram (Travels 75).

In the above passage from his eighteenth-century travel journal Quaker naturalist William
Bartram describes the bank of the St. John’s River in Florida where he encountered and fought
with roaring and bellowing alligators. This ordeal culminates in an intense interspecies faceoff as
a twelve-foot long alligator confronts Bartram and climbs ashore to stare the traveler down. In
this moment, alligator and human-animal acknowledge and challenge each other for a catch of
fish in the narrator’s canoe. Seeing that the alligator is not afraid of him, Bartram kills the hungry
reptile by “lodging the contents of [his] gun in his head” (75-77). At first glance this frequently
anthologized passage, like the other descriptions of animal deaths in Travels, might seem to
portray Bartram the literary character as an adventure-seeking hunter.8 While Bartram records
the same actions as hunters during his travels, he captures something more than hunting—
moments in the lives of early American frontier animals and the narrator’s reactions to
encountering these animals and often witnessing their deaths.
This project focuses on these moments of human and animal interaction, where the blurring
of the human/animal boundary occurs, because, while other scholars have touched upon this
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Some scholars interpret Bartram’s narration as “catalog[ing] the pleasures of the gentleman hunter” (Imbarrato 84).
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issue, none have explored it deeply from an ecofeminist/ human-animal studies paradigm. M.
Allewaert, for example, considers human subjectivity but not animal subjectivity. Allewaert
argues that the narrator’s experiences in the swamp shatter the Anglo-European fantasy of
Edmund Burke’s sublime because the narrator experiences immediate danger—Burke’s sublime
spectator stays safe and separate from the dangerous spectacle being observed (344-45).9
Bartram’s inability to maintain a safe, sublime order in his narration leaves his own human
subjectivity undefined against the threatening backdrop of the swamp while also resisting the
subject-object separation of colonial discourse that the sublime enables (345). In another
example, Matthew Wynn Sivils approaches Travels from an ecocritical perspective but uses a
different focus than that of human-animal studies theory. Sivils argues that Travels features a
mixture of “pastoral imagery and biological description” to vividly convey interdependent
ecological communities of the early American frontier (58). In one example, Sivils identifies the
comparison of humans to a community of mayflies as a literary device to teach humans “about
the human condition within the natural world” (60-62). This thesis chapter, however, argues that
the human and animal encounters in the text teach readers about something more than the
“human” condition—these moments show the narrator recognizing animal subjectivity and
advocating for animals.
To recover the nonhuman semiotic exchanges, I examine the narrator’s acknowledgement
of and responses to the communication of a bear cub, a spider, sandhill cranes, rattlesnakes, and
an alligator; and argue that the narrator presents these overlooked nonhuman animals as
“speaking” subjects with agency. In each account, the narrative moves from an objective to a
9

Kiene Brillenburg Wurth characterizes Bartram’s viewing of a “monstrous” battle, before the large alligator attacks
him, as a “tentative evocation of the sublime” (27).
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subjective view. The narrator seems to be moving nonhuman marginalized animals into focus
because dominant cultural constructions present animals as objects. To signal this change in
vision, Bartram acknowledges a connection with nonhumans and seeks to respect their individual
agency.
Published in 1791, Travels through North & South Carolina, Georgia, East & West
Florida represents Bartram’s edited account of his earlier four year trek across the southern
colonial American frontier to catalogue plants and animals for his British employer, Dr. John
Fothergill, a Fellow of the Royal Society of London. Bartram appealed to Fothergill to sponsor
his seed-and specimen-gathering trip after his failed careers as a trader and Florida planter,
mounting debts, and increased pressure to live up to his father’s reputation as the King’s Botanist
(Magee 46-47,71-73, 85-89). This journey brought the nature-loving Bartram face-to-face with a
plethora of real American animals such as a bear cub, a silky haired spider, a sandhill crane, a
rattlesnake, and the “old daring” alligator (Bartram lvii, lxi, 139-40, 170, 77). Scholars generally
agree that Travels stands as a forerunner to American nature writing such as Walden (1854),
Annie Dillard’s Pilgrim at Tinker Creek (1974), and many other American nature texts (Charles
H. Adams 66; Hallock 150). Philip G. Terrie even marks Travels as the beginning of the
American nature writing tradition, noting his influence on Coleridge, Wordsworth, and Emerson
(17-18).
While scholars often remark upon many subtly subversive qualities of Travels, none
explore the moments where the narrator presents animals as subjects with agency.10 Thomas
Hallock acknowledges that while Travels includes visions of a frontier developed for human use,
10

See Eve Kornfeld for a discussion of the “subtle subversions” of dominant early American colonial discourses in
Travels, which she explains are the result of a “prolonged and transformative encounter with the Other” (314).
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the narrator also appreciates nature in its undeveloped state (169-72). Charles H. Adams
identifies Bartram’s playful, diverse writing style as ecological rhetoric, which he sees as
Bartram’s attempt to go beyond scientific classification and fully depict the complexity of
nonhuman frontier life. Adams explains that the ecological rhetoric in Travels consciously resists
attributes of dominant writing styles to mirror the diversity of nature and illustrate the
interdependence of all living beings (72-73). Adams explains that Travels succeeds in this effort
by creating “an effect analogous to Bakhtinian polyphony, a rhetorical pluralism in which no
single discourse can represent the full range of nature’s meaning” (72). Allewaert also reads
Travels as resistant to the colonial nationalism of the early republic that insisted on appropriating
land and resources for the new nation. According to Allewaert, humans gain agency by working
with nonhuman nature to resist the economics and politics of the plantation zone. Bartram
complicates the objectifying Linnaean naming system by explaining how plants and humans are
interdependent in the plantation zone for survival (340-43).
By most accounts, the naturalist occupation precluded viewing animals and humans as
equals. Early Euroamerican botanists appropriated British colonial naturalist cataloging methods
for use in the new republic. The Enlightenment belief in a solid human/animal boundary carried
over to these British naturalist methods (Lewis 68). According to the Great Chain of Being
theory, all living beings fit into a linear, hierarchal chain ranging from least to most advanced,
with humans as the most superior beings; naturalists’ use of Linnaean taxonomy supported this
theory (Magee 148-51). Belief in a “natural” hierarchy of beings and that nonhuman nature
operated mechanically contributed to the perception that nonhuman nature was Other, less-than-
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human (Bell 165-166). Essentially, the idea that humans could control and manipulate nature
stood central to Enlightenment and, later, naturalist thought (Magee 132). 11
Ecofeminist theory assumes that all beings are harmed when humans categorize in ways
that create binaries (man/nature, human/animal, etc.) and that mark as “less than” one side of the
binary (Gates 21). Such binaries enable and rationalize systems of domination and oppression.
American botanists who appropriated European naturalist research methods were therefore more
likely to see nonhuman animals and nature as Other. Evidence suggests that they in fact viewed
nature as an object and attempted to colonize nature by defining and claiming a distinctly
“American” wilderness (Lewis 65-69). Timothy Sweet proposes that nature emerged as an object
upon which early Euroamericans built the foundation of the fledgling nation’s economy—an
unsustainable eco-economic base that he says Americans still continue to rely upon (Sweet 422).
These Enlightenment beliefs and naturalist practices emerge in early Euroamerican travel writing
as calls to “civilize,” and “improve” the American frontier through settlement, deforestation and
farming (Imbarrato 70).
With my ecocritical/human-animal studies lens I find more than another subversion of
Enlightenment colonial discourse; I recover the voices of nonhuman Others in the text, the
emotional responses that they elicit from the narrator, and the narrator’s appeals to respect
nonhuman animals. This chapter opens a new way to understand the narrator’s relationship with
animals in Travels—as a form of early American nonhuman advocacy. Is Bartram’s text also a
11

Scholars remain divided as to what discourses influenced Bartram’s different view of nature, which departs from a
purely objective, colonial paradigm. Larry R. Clarke and Burt Kornegay both explore the possible influence of the
Quaker faith on Bartram’s perception of nature. Bruce Silver, however, argues that no distinct Quaker beliefs appear
in Bartram’s observations of nature in the text; instead, he cites other possible philosophical influences. Nancy E.
Hoffmann argues that the draft manuscripts for Travels feature a pilgrim narrator waiting for a Quaker-like
“inpouring of spirit” from the natural world; she speculates that Bartram edited the pilgrim narrator out of the
published version because of the diverse religious backgrounds of his readers (285).
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precursor to American animal rights writings? The nonhuman emotions, connections, and
interspecies communication that the narrator in Travels describes continue to be perceived as
extraordinary instead of the norm. Examining this early Euroamerican text is useful for
beginning to explain why Americans relate to animals the way we do today and broaching the
discussion about more respectful and sustainable ways to relate to animals.

(Re)conceptualizing Speaking Subjects to Recover Voices

In order to uncover the animal voices in Travels I use a non-anthropocentric definition of
subjectivity, which accepts nonhuman knowledge, communication, and ways of knowing. The
narrator in Travels acknowledging nonhuman semiotic exchanges as communication ultimately
allows him to view them as subjects, respect them, and advocate on their behalf. Defining
subjectivity as any being capable of responding, even non-volitionally, allows for a definition
that includes more than humans. According to Patrick D. Murphy, when fiction models an
expanded type of subjectivity, it creates a space where humans can see and acknowledge a
greater connection with the nonhuman world, which leads to greater respect for it (“Subjects”).
The narrator in Travels acknowledges and is moved by various animals’ semiotic exchanges so
much that his language changes to acknowledge their subjectivity after he perceives them as
communicating with him. Murphy argues that a more accurate portrayal of human connectedness
with the natural world in fiction reduces the harmful behavior that results from perceiving one’s
identity as detached from the world:
These fictions distinguish rather than conflate the subject of their plots and the
identities of their characters. Furthermore, they distinguish between heroes’
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bodies, the selves identified with those bodies and the subject positions and
identities that develop for those embodied selves. As a result, this latter group of
literary texts offers more complex and thereby more realistic representations of
human entanglement and engagement in the rest of the material world. It is my
contention that such complex representations can play an important part in
developing a potentially less destructive form of human self-perception than the
one dominant in the cultures in which these works are written. (“Subjects” 122)
Murphy defines subjectivity not in terms of the capacity for human language or human
knowledge but instead as the ability to respond to another being with “any form of semiotic
exchange,” which includes “non-volitional utterances” (123-24).
“Accessary to what now appeared to be a cruel murder”

Travels begins as Bartram reviews the most significant discoveries about plants and
animals from his journey through the early American frontier. Among his discoveries he
recounts witnessing hunters murder a bear for “the sake of the skin and oil” and then killing the
bear’s cub as he was crying for his mother (lvii). The tone of narration before the murder of the
mother bear describes her and her cub as objects. This tone shifts to acknowledge the bears’
subjectivity as a result of the cub’s cries and gestures:
[In] the evening my hunter, who was an excellent marksman, said that he would
shoot one of [the bears], for the sake of the skin and oil, for we had plenty and
variety of provisions in our bark. We accordingly, on sight of two of them,
planned our approaches, as artfully as possible, by crossing over to the opposite
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shore, in order to get under cover of a small island, this we cautiously coasted
round, to a point . . . we gained gradually on our prey by this artifice, without their
noticing us, finding ourselves near enough, the hunter fired, and laid the largest
dead on the spot, where she stood, when presently the [cub], not seeming the least
moved, at the report of our piece, approached the dead body. (lvii)
This passage is narrated with a procedural and methodical tone. The narrator explains that the
hunter plans to kill a bear, describes how they approach unseen for a good shot, and that the
hunter killed the bear in a single shot. The detached narration lacks any emotion and simply
states the strategy of the hunters. Essentially, the objectification of the bears enables the murder;
the responsibility for destroying an object is much less than that for killing a subject. The
narrator never names the hunters but instead only calls them “hunters,” defining them in relation
to their ability to kill animals. He praises his hired hunter as “an excellent marksman” (lvii).
As the narrator describes his part in the pursuit of the mother bear, he simply calls her
“our prey” and “the largest” (lvii). Categorizing the bear as “prey” and “the largest” denies the
bear’s subjectivity and, therefore, individuality and ability for semiotic exchange. This language
separates “bearness” from “humanness.” Calling the bear large prey disguises the killing of a
subject who is capable of response. The term “prey” invokes the construct of the hunter, which
works to naturalize the actions of the men. As “prey,” the bear is seen as an object of the hunt,
destined to be shot and used by humans. Also, by describing the mother bear as simply “the
largest,” she is itemized as the object with the most capital value, the most fur and oil. This
language functions to distance “humans” from the bears by denying the bears’ individual worth.
These connotations reinforce what Donna J. Haraway calls the illusory human/animal binary.
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Haraway explains that that the belief that humans are separate and superior to animals exists as a
myth designed to define “human” against the “animal” (When Species Meet 77-78). This belief
creates false boundaries between human animals and nonhuman animals, which leads to the
reduction of those categorized as nonhuman objects. Haraway calls for a confusion of these sorts
of boundaries to escape false generalizations and dichotomies (Symians 163-64).
From an ecocritical perspective Bartram’s hunting party pursues the bears not for
sustenance but only for their fur and oil, wasting their meat. The hunters with Bartram lack
respect for the individual animals by failing to acknowledge the significance of killing them.
Hunting practices which align closer to an ecocritical paradigm than the actions of Bartram’s
hunting party existed in early America. Early American Powhatan hunters, for example, believed
a successful hunt occurred because of the hunter’s skill, the will of the spirits, and the animal
offering itself to humans because of a relationship of mutual respect: “Hunting was not only a
display of human prowess but also an opportunity to acknowledge the reciprocal relations
linking men and animals. Guided by spiritual protectors, animals offered themselves as gifts to
humans in return for evidence of gratitude and respect” (DeJohn Anderson 28-29). Although
skilled marksmen, the hunters with Bartram fail to see their connection with the nonhumans,
respect their prey as subjects with agency, and only see the successful hunt as a result of their
individual skills. This anthropocentric view of the hunt prevents them from engaging in a
respectful relationship and heeding Bartram’s pleas to leave the cub alive after killing the mother
bear.
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The Child-like Cub Cries Out
Immediately after the mother bear is shot “dead on the spot,” Bartram refers to her as
“she” for the first time (lvii). This indicates that by watching her die he became aware of the loss
of her individual life. In this passage the narrator also notices the cub speak as a subject, an
individual telling his story and expressing his agency through his gestures and cries:
[The cub] approached the dead body, smelled, and pawed it, and appearing in
agony, fell to weeping and looking upwards, then towards us, and cried out like a
child. Whilst our boat approached very near, the hunter was loading his rifle in
order to shoot the survivor, which was a young cub, and the slain supposed to be
the dam. (lvii)
In this passage, the cub breaks through the narration to express his emotions. Viewing these cries
and gestures with Murphy’s definition of subjectivity, they express the bear’s individual
subjectivity. The cub witnesses his mother fall after being shot; approaches, and “smelled, and
pawed” her body (lvii). With these gestures the cub tries to communicate with his mother; he
urges her to respond. The lack of a response leads him to react “in agony, [and] fall to weeping”
(lvii). The cub’s expressions of suffering confirm that he is a subject expressing his loss and not
a mere prey object, or object of scientific study.
Although the narrator describes the cub’s emotions anthropomorphically, this
anthropomorphism aids the narrator in conveying the cub’s subjectivity. By depicting him as an
“afflicted child, bereft of its parent,” the powerful image of a crying human child encourages
humans to extend the same sympathies for the cub as an orphaned human child (lvii). According
to enlightenment science, animal behaviors or noises were thought of as “mere mechanical
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impulses,” or “instinct” (Bartram lvi). The child-like cub connotes feelings, emotions, and the
pain of a mother’s death, thereby disrupting the image of animals as pure instinctual beings.
Some Ecofeminist and human-animal studies scholars explain that in most instances
anthropomorphizing animals leads to anthropocentric thinking, which prioritizes humans over
nonhumans (Symians, Haraway; Literature, Nature, and Other, Murphy106-16; Raber 99). Karla
Armbruster argues, however, that anthropomorphic animal figures can be used to explore messy,
intertwined human and nonhuman relationships by complicating the boundary between human
and animal instead of collapsing it and erasing the animal (106-16). Likewise, in the narrator’s
encounter with the cub, human traits are ascribed to the cub illustrating similarities between
human and bear emotions instead of erasing the cub’s emotions. The cub’s cries are described as
child-like, which makes the suffering in the cub’s voice relatable enough for humans to
recognize his suffering. Therefore, while associating the bear cub with a human child risks
missing the cub’s suffering entirely, viewing the anthropomorphic aspects of the bear cub shows
human and bear similarities.
In the following passage, the narrator describes his own reciprocal emotional response
triggered by watching and listening to the cub:
[T]he continual cries of this afflicted child, bereft of its parent, affected me very
sensibly, I was moved with compassion, and charging myself as if accessary to
what now appeared to be a cruel murder, and endeavoured to prevail on the hunter
to save its life, but to no effect! (lvii)
The narrator remarks that the cub’s vocalized anguish “affected [him] very sensibly” and
“moved [him] with compassion” (lvii). He also calls the mother bear’s death a “murder.” The
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realization that the animal experiences feeling direct his use of the word murder. The word
“murder” connotes an acknowledgement of the bear’s subjectivity. Essentially, when the narrator
chooses the word “murder” to describe the death of the mother bear at the hunter’s hands, his
word choice shows that that she is a subject that can be murdered. Haraway explains that saying
only “humans” can be “murdered” is a semantic tactic, which comes from our denial that
nonhuman animals are capable of response; this denial maintains the false label of “human” in
contrast to the instinctual “animal” (When Species Meet 77-79).
In addition to the narrator’s emotional reaction to the mother bear’s death and the cub’s
cries, he advocates for the cub, demanding that the hunter let him live: the narrator “endeavoured
to prevail on the hunter to save its life, but to no effect!” (lvii). The narrator explains that that
hunter fails to perceive the bears as beings worthy of compassion. The hunter is blind to the
human and nonhuman kinship that the narrator sees through the cub’s expressions of suffering.
Therefore, the hunter is unable to see shooting the cub as killing a fellow subject: “for by habit
he had become insensible to compassion towards the brute creation, being now within a few
yards of the harmless devoted victim, he fired, and laid it dead upon the body of the dam” (lvii).
Even though the narrator fails to advocate for the cub to the hunter, he still comes to see the
bears as speaking subjects with emotions and agency that deserve to live.

From Other to (An)other

In the same passage, the narrator exhibits another vital component to acknowledging
nonhuman subjectivity and the human connection to the nonhuman world: recognizing that the
cub returns his gaze. While in the beginning of this passage the narrator describes the bear hunt
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from his procedural, objectifying gaze, after the mother bear’s death and the cub’s cries, he
recognizes that the cub gazes back at him. Murphy explains “anotherness” as understanding that
“one’s self is always someone else’s other, and both are another to each other” (Literature,
Nature, and Other 137). Respect for species diversity and interdependence accompany this
recognition of (an)other being’s gaze. The narrator acknowledges the cub as (an)other when he
explains to readers how the cub looks back at the hunting party: “[the cub was] looking upwards,
then towards us, and cried out like a child” (lvii). By recognizing the cub’s ability to look back at
the hunters and himself, the narrator then functions as (an)other being to the cub. The narrator’s
recognition of the cub gazing back acts in conjunction with the anthropomorphic depiction of his
cries to depict the cub as an agent expressing himself. Through the image of a child-like cub—
“this afflicted child, bereft of its parent”—looking at the killers of his mother while crying, the
cub is empowered with a knowing, intelligent gaze that demonstrates that nonhuman nature
looks back at us (lvii) The narrator, therefore, recognizes that the cub exists as (an)other being,
instead of something Other. The narrator also repeats this realization when he sees a spider as
(an)other.

Seeing the Nonhuman in the Meal

Later in Travels, the narrator presents a similar scene of recognition, but this time he
expresses a greater degree of interconnectedness and advocacy for nonhumans. The narrator’s
objectifying scientist’s gaze transforms to advocacy for the hunted animal when the hunting
party brings him a dead Florida sandhill crane. Bartram first sees the crane after the hunters
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shoot the bird and bring his body to camp for dinner. The narrator records all of the details of the
crane with scientific objectivity:
This stately bird is above six feet in length from toes to the extremity of the beak
when extended, and the wings expand eight or nine feet; they are above five feet
high when standing erect; the tail is remarkably short, but the flag or pendant
feathers which fall down off the rump on each side, are very long and sharp
pointed, of a delicate texture, and silky softness . . . the crown of the head bare of
feathers, of a reddish rose colour, thinly barbed with short, stiff black hair. (139)
After thoroughly measuring each part of the crane, recording the various shapes and colors of his
feathers, and describing how his wings fit to the body and operate for flight, the narrator’s tone
becomes regretful. As with the bear vignette, after the narrator’s initial observations, he
transitions to explaining how the crane is a speaking subject capable of expressing “passions and
affections” through bird language (140). While Bartram depicts the bears as displaying family
ties and rational and emotional behavior after he witnesses the mother bear’s murder, the
moment of transition in the crane passage occurs when he eats the crane in soup.
The narrator immediately visualizes the crane when he looks at the soup, unlike the
unacknowledged animals that he considered “provisions” at the beginning of the bear passage.12
He knows he consumes another living being that was “shot in the adjoining meadows” (139).
When the crane soup is served, Bartram’s descriptions shift from objective to portraying the bird
as an otherworldly being. He imagines the crane flying, instead of floating in his soup:

12

See Kathryn E. Holland Braund for an examination of Bartram’s meals during his journey, including the sandhill
crane soup. Braund finds that Bartram’s meals reveal much about Native American and early southern American
diets.
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We had this fowl dressed for supper and it made excellent soup; nevertheless as
long as I can get any other necessary food I shall prefer his seraphic music in the
etherial skies, and my eyes and understanding gratified in observing their
economy and social communities, in the expansive green savannas of Florida.
(140)
Although the narrator admits that the “foul” makes “excellent soup,” he vows never to eat crane
again because he would rather hear “seraphic music in the etherial skies” (140). The choice of
the words “seraphic” and “etherial” connote an angelic and heavenly being—clearly an idealized
image of cranes. These words also imply that cranes exist as superhuman creatures, making the
human killing and consumption of him seem more unfortunate.
The narrator’s idealization of the dead crane makes sense in light of his depiction of birds
in the introduction, in which the narrator describes how he admires birds because they
communicate, possess emotions, and live interdependently. The narrator explains that he sees
birds as particularly intelligent beings with the capacity to communicate with each other via
language; he clarifies that this language birds use is unique to birds: “language in birds, is the
common notes or speech, that they use when employed in feeding themselves and their young,
calling on one another, as well as their menaces against their enemy” (lix-lx). Here he also
explains that some birds even work interdependently to care for orphaned young from other
species (lx). This information clarifies what the narrator means by envisioning the cranes
interacting in “social communities” (140). In light of this information from the introduction, the
narrator must know that the dead crane was intelligent and capable of semiotic exchange with
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other beings, meaning he viewed him as a subject before he examined and ate him, which
explains the regret.
As he reflects upon the significance of the crane’s death, the narrator expresses regret by
vowing never to eat another crane “as [he] can get any other necessary food” (140). This signals
that the narrator accepts responsibility for the crane’s death—that the crane died to feed humans.
In this way, Bartram models Haraway’s concept of living responsibly within the need to kill.
Haraway offers that humans should recognize the significance of each animal killing and “learn
to live responsibly within the multiplicitous necessity and labor of killing,” instead of using
semantics to naturalize animal killing for the benefit of “humans;” in short, humans need to
recognize “that earthly heterogeneous beings are in this web together for all time, and no one
gets to be Man” (When Species Meet 80, 82).
Bartram also explains how his livelihood as a naturalist depends on the presence of
nonhuman animals like the crane. The narrator says that he learns about the cranes from cranes,
demonstrating his recognition of his dependence on the birds for knowledge. Also, beyond
knowledge, the aurally and visually pleasing cranes provide him with a source of enjoyment:
“my eyes and understanding gratified in observing their economy and social communities, in the
expansive green savannas of Florida” (140). Murphy argues that recognition of interanimation
(the ways that species learn and grow through interaction with each other) leads to interspecies
growth and survival (Literature, Nature, and Other 23). As Bartram regretfully digests one of
these birds that assisted in his growth as a naturalist, the narrator advocates for all cranes to be
left in the skies instead of hunted. This acts as a powerful visualization of interspecies
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entanglement: Bartram needed to eat the crane for food but regrets his death because cranes
bring him enjoyment and knowledge.
Because neither Bartram nor the reader sees the crane alive, the crane is unable to
communicate for himself in the text. Unlike Bartram’s treatment of the bear cub, in which
anthropomorphic metaphors risk describing an animal with human qualities to portray him as a
speaking subject, the narrator avoids these metaphors. Although he does attempt to idealize the
crane as an otherworldly, angelic being, when contextualized with the information in the
introduction, it is clear the narrator sees the cranes as subjects. Like the bear vignette, this
passage demonstrates a shift from objectifying a nonhuman with scientific observations to
lauding the crane’s subjectivity. In this example, however, the shift was based on previous
observations of crane semiotic capability. This encounter still contained a form of avocation for
all cranes: a reflection on why cranes should be left in the sky instead of eaten as a meal.

When (An)other Gazes Back with Eight Eyes
During Bartram’s description of his encounter with a “buff colour” spider “the size of a
pigeons egg” readers see the spider speaking through gestures (lix). Like the bear cub, Bartram
sees the spider as (an)other, who instead of being a mere object of his gaze possesses the power
to look back at him and even defend himself if needed:
As I was gathering specimens of flowers from the shrubs, I was greatly surprised
at the sudden appearance of a remarkable large spider on a leaf, of the genus
Araneus saliens, at the sight of me he boldly faced about, and raised himself up as
if ready to spring upon me.” (lviii-lix)
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Bartram respectfully acknowledges that the spider challenges him because he inadvertently
invaded the spider’s space while collecting plant specimens; therefore, the narrator respects the
spider and withdraws from close proximity. By turning around and facing Bartram, and by
attempting to seem larger, the spider communicates his unease with the human animal who
interrupted his hunt. In response the narrator attempts to put the spider at ease before further
observation: “after I had recovered from the surprise, and observing the wary hunter had retired
under cover, I drew near again, and presently discovered that I had surprised him on predatory
attempts against the insect tribes” (lix). The visual image of Bartram and the spider mutually
surprising and acknowledging one (an)other is a powerful testament to the effect that nonhuman
animals can have on human animals and vice versa. After the spider’s successful
communication, the narrator recounts the spider hunting a bumble bee:
[T]his cunning intrepid hunter (conducted his subtil approaches, with the
circumspection and perseverance of a Siminole, when hunting a deer) advancing
with slow steps obliquely, or under the coverage of dense foliage, and behind the
limbs, and when the bee was engaged in probing a flower he would leap nearer,
and then instantly retire out of sight, under a leaf or behind a branch, at the same
time keeping a sharp eye upon me. (lix)
Acknowledging that the spider has the power to “keep an eye on him,” again demonstrates
Bartram’s perception of himself as (an)other to the spider (lix). The spider asserts his agency,
reacting to Bartram and demonstrating his semiotic communication with a knowing gaze. In
moving away from the spider to respect his space, the narrator illustrates that the spider
communicating to the narrator serves to transform his perspective of the spider. Initially the
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spider is only defined by his Linnaean name, “Arsneus saliens” (lviii). This name marks the
spider as an object, a resource catalogued for later use by the new republic. After the spider
gestures to signal displeasure, however, Bartram sees him as a speaking subject that he respects.
The narrator imagines the spider as Native American instead of Euroamerican; Bartram
himself admired and respected Native Americans and rejected the idea that “they were deserving
of the severe censure, which prevailed against them among the white people” (lx). He proposed
that the United States should only judge Native Americans on their civility in friendly cultural
situations; liaisons should learn their language, customs, history, judicial system, religion, and
traditions (lxi). The anthropomorphic Seminole-spider, who skillfully hunts his food using his
natural surroundings, “under the cover of dense foliage and behind the limbs,” makes the hunters
who “murder” the bear and her child-like cub with guns for skin and oil seem unskillful,
disrespectful, and unnatural (lix). In this context, the narrator’s association of spider and
Seminole emphasizes the narrator’s admiration for this nonhuman animal. Therefore, Bartram’s
anthropomorphic description simultaneously elevates the spider and Native Americans, who
would both be considered “uncivilized” according to dominant colonial ideology.
Throughout this passage, the narrator explains interdependency in the vicinity of the
spider. He describes how the flower feeds the bee, which feeds the spider, which he imagines
“perhaps before night became himself, the delicious evening repast of a bird or lizard” (lix). For
the narrator, all beings, from plant life to larger predators, depend upon one another for
sustenance. The spider-Seminole-deer-hunter is a powerfully resonant image of the human and
nonhuman connection. Instead of placing the human at the top of this food chain, he imagines a
human in the middle. Therefore, by linking the skillful, hunting spider to a human (the Native
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American), he places humans amidst this interdependent web of life, bringing them into a
heterarchical, interspecies relationship where all are knotted together in reliance upon one
another. The account of stumbling into a bush and pausing to meditate on the human animal
connection to a random spider shows that even “humans” depend upon, and are connected to
flowers, spiders, birds and lizards.

Accepting the Responsibility of Killing

When faced with a nonhuman animal with the power to kill him, the narrator acutely
perceives that human animals cannot control nonhuman animals because they are subjects in
their own right with their own agency to make choices. The narrator tells of Seminoles who
evacuated their camp because of the presence of a large rattlesnake. They refused to kill the
snake because of their “extraordinary veneration or dread of the rattle snake,” which led them to
implore the narrator to kill the snake (164). Bartram kills the snake only after he “at length
consented” for the sake of the “greatly disturbed” Native Americans (164-65). Before killing the
snake, he carefully describes his peaceful behavior: “the dreaded and revered serpent leisurely
traversed their camp, visiting the fire places from one to another, picking up fragments of their
provisions and licking their platters” (165). The narrator makes it explicitly clear that he already
respects the rattlesnake before he begins to hunt it. He made sure to kill the snake
instantaneously with a blow to the head: he “luckily . . . dispatched him instantly,” showed his
head “as a trophy of victory” to the Seminoles, and then stored his fangs with his specimens
(165). Because Bartram says he kills the snake only to help the Seminoles, Bartram’s “victory”
can be read as a celebration that no one was bitten and that the snake died a quick death because
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of Bartram’s skill. The narrator models for the reader that killing a snake is not a light decision.
The subtext of the narrator’s actions says that one should spare nonhumans from suffering if
killing is necessary, and accept responsibility for the killing—which Haraway claims in a
necessary step to move towards a full recognition of our intertwinement with nonhumans and
finding healthier ways to treat and relate to nonhumans (When Species Meet 88-90).

In Praise of Rattlesnake Restraint
Unlike the previous examples, this snake’s death in the Seminole camp fails to transform
the narrator’s view of nonhuman animals. Instead, it acts as a prelude to a series of stories from
the narrator’s past that taught him that rattlesnakes are subjects. He uses these stories to explain
why he serves as “an advocate or vindicator of the benevolent and peaceable disposition of
animal creation,” which includes rattlesnakes (168). He explains that the rattlesnake is “a
wonderful creature, when we consider his form, nature and disposition” because “he is never
known to strike until he is first assaulted or fears himself in danger, and even then always gives
the earliest warning by the rattles at the extremity of his tail” (167). The narrator’s account of the
rattlesnake death in the Seminole village leads to an argument for the entire species; the narrator
vows to prevent future rattlesnake deaths at the hands of humans.
He revisits a memory of how he and his friends walked by a rattlesnake several times in
the woods at night. The animal had the power to kill the youths but instead chose not to bite them
and merely observed them as they walked nearby. When young Bartram realized that the snake
refrained from harming humans, his view of the rattlesnake shifted. He sees the rattlesnake’s
gaze on him as one of restraint: “he lay quiet whilst I surveyed him, appearing no way surprised
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or disturbed, but kept his half-shut eyes fixed on me” (169). This transforms his view of the
rattlesnake. Bartram credits God and “the dignified nature of the generous though terrible
creature, who had suffered us all to pass many times by him during the night, without injuring us
in the least, although we must have touched him” (169). Recalling this incident enables Bartram
to narrate a discussion where the youths reach a rational decision to allow the snake to live
because they acknowledge it as a reasonable subject. This story models the rhetorical design of
the other animal vignettes so far discussed: describing a moment when a nonhuman animal
communicates to the narrator, which leads him to recognize the nonhuman animal’s subjectivity.
This rattlesnake passage contains an additional message however; the snake could easily choose
to kill human animals as the humans could choose to kill the snake. This destabilizes the
human/animal hierarchy characteristic of Enlightenment thinking.
Upon recalling a lesson from his father that snakes attack only if aggravated, and a third
rattlesnake encounter from his youth, the narrator confessed that “fright” led him to kill the third
snake that he encountered. He regretted this killing because the snake had the opportunity to bite
him and chose not to: “I however, was sorry after killing the serpent when cooly recollecting
every circumstance, he certainly had it in his power to kill me almost instantly, and I made no
doubt that he was conscious of it” (170). In this instance Bartram failed to pause and assess the
situation, which resulted in the snake’s death. He reacted on instinct, which Enlightenment
science says separates “humans” from “animals.” After his fear subsided he recalls the event
when the large rattlesnake is later served in several dishes for dinner. As with the crane example,
the narrator is deeply aware that the “snake served up in several dishes” was a subject, which
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most likely explains why Bartram “tasted of it but could not swallow it” (170). The distance
from immediate danger also allows Bartram to regret and accept responsibility for snake’s death.
By viewing the snake as (an)other once the danger passes he is able to see the events
from the snake’s perspective and realizes that the rattlesnake “was conscious of” his power to
kill (170). Ironically, the supposedly “mechanical” creature acted rationally while Bartram
reacted with instinct. After recalling these memories, the narrator vows to readers that he will
“never again be accessary to the death of a rattle snake, which promise [he has] invariably kept
to” (170). These demonstrations of agency, the voluntary choices of all of the rattlesnakes he
encountered to not harm him, deeply affect Bartram. The narrator advocates for no further harm
to rattlesnakes with these stories, which show they are subjects capable of independent thought
and action.
The Alligator’s Choice

Reading the vignettes of the bears, crane, spider, and rattlesnakes together establishes
another way to interpret the widely anthologized alligator passage. Garnering a more complete
understanding than simply reading the alligator’s death as “his most celebrated victory” allows a
broader understanding of Bartram’s view of animals (Braund 35). The narrator experiences
moments of transformation when the animals speak to him; he then sees them as subjects worth
respecting and not deserving of death. The various animals’ subjectivity and agency expressed
through their semiotic exchanges with Bartram speak of their reaction to the human presence of
Bartram’s traveling party. These vignettes also demonstrate the narrator’s recognition of his
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connection to the nonhuman world. The narrator shows that his respect for nonhumans follows
recognition of nonhuman subjectivity and species interdependence.
But what happens when, unlike the rattlesnake, the animal decides he wants to fight with
the narrator? In the widely anthologized alligator encounter, the narrator witnesses two large
alligators battling in the water. They are depicted as supernatural monsters battling like dragons:
Clouds of smoke issue from his dilated nostrils. The earth trembles with his
thunder. When immediately from the opposite coast of the lagoon, emerges from
the deep his rival champion. . . . Again they rise, their jaws clap together . . . when
the contest ends . . . and the vanquished makes a hazardous escape . . . The shores
and forests resound his dreadful roar, together with the triumphing shouts of the
plaited tribes around, witnesses of the horrid combat. (75-76)
In this vignette the narrator portrays the alligators in a mythic, dragon-like way, bypassing the
usual objective observations. The tone of the passage reflects the narrator’s fear and admiration
for the fighting amphibians. The alligators’ “clouds of smoke,” “dilated nostrils” and trembling
earth seem reminiscent of the supernatural power of dragons battling. Alligators aurally disturb
the forest with “thunder,” “dreadful roar[s],” and “triumphing shouts,” another otherworldly
characterization. These descriptions indicate fear, awe, and respect for the power of the battling
alligators.
After witnessing this alligator battle, Bartram decides to fish before there are too many
alligators present—a decision that results in a faceoff with a large alligator. He paddles his canoe
from the shore of his camp towards a lagoon to catch trout and is “attacked on all sides, [by]
several [alligators] endeavoring to overset the canoe . . . rushing up with their heads and part of

50

their bodies above the water, roaring terribly and belching floods of water” (76). After clubbing
the many alligators to fend them off of his canoe, the narrator succeeds in catching trout for his
dinner. He is followed “particularly by an old daring one, about twelve feet in length, who kept
close after [him], and when [he] stepped on shore and turned about, in order to draw up [his]
canoe, he rushed up near [Bartram’s] feet and lay there for some time, looking [him] in the face,
his head and shoulders out of water” (77). The narrator views the alligator’s nonverbal
possession of the canoe as a territorial threat. In this moment, Bartram knows the alligator looks
at him with intelligent eyes “looking at [him], and seeming neither fearful nor any way
disturbed” as they acknowledge each other (77). As with the cub, spider, and rattlesnakes, the
narrator knows that the alligator is a fellow subject with his own agency.
In contrast to the rattlesnakes that let Bartram pass, the alligators attack Bartram, and the
“old daring” twelve-foot long alligator pursues him onto land and challenges him for his fish.
Here is where the nature-loving naturalist, who already had “good reason to dread the subtle
attacks of the allegators” becomes “resolved [the alligator] should pay for his temerity” (75,77).
He retrieves his gun from his camp, and returns to his canoe to find the alligator “with his foot on
the gunwale of the boat, in search of fish” (77). Bartram’s other appeals for humans to leave
bears, cranes, spiders, and rattlesnakes unmolested are absent when he kills the alligator by
“lodging the contents of [his] gun in his head” (77). The alligator threatens the narrator’s life,
and Bartram, realizing that the alligator has the power to kill him, must resort to using his gun.
Similar to Bartram’s recognition of the cub’s, spider’s, and rattlesnakes’ ability to look at him
with semiotic glances, Bartram sees that the alligator looks at him with the knowing eyes of a
fellow subject. Unfortunately, this exchange ends in the alligator’s death because the alligator
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does not offer Bartram the restraint that the rattlesnake demonstrated. The alligator passage
conveys perhaps the most important message of all of these vignettes: humans cannot control
nonhuman subjects.
The narrator’s strange and fantastic alligator encounter comes into focus as a reminder
that nonhuman animals are subjects with their own agency. They may choose to control or kill
human animals just as humans try to control and kill them. The killing of the alligator was not
for sport, pleasure, or to win a victory over a powerful dragon-like warrior. Instead, recognizing
that the alligator is a fellow rational creature, Bartram shoots him because the alligator chooses
to threaten him.
Perhaps this analysis sheds light on why the real-life Bartram was reluctant to discuss the
alligator encounter after Travels was published. English Quaker Henry Wansey wrote in his
diary that “when one of his companions made joking reference to the encounters with alligators
described in the Travels, Bartram ‘became so reserved, that we could get but little conversation
with him’” (qtd. in Slaughter 603). Perhaps, where the narrator fails to mourn the death of the
alligator because he was afraid of the amphibian killing him, the real-life Bartram, upon
reflection, sees the alligator’s death as a loss—a death that he accepts responsibility for and
acknowledges the full weight of killing a fellow subject.
In the vignettes explored in this thesis chapter, each nonhuman asserts its agency through
various sounds, gestures, and actions that result in the narrator responding to them as fellow
subjects. Their gestures, responses, and utterances are their expressions of agency that allow the
narrator to view them as more than objects for scientific observation: the bear cub cries and
gestures, the spider reacts with movements to express himself, the various rattlesnakes refrain
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from attacking humans, and the alligators perform territorial displays. Even the dead crane that
the narrator encounters sparks memories of cranes communicating and living in complex,
interdependent communities, which elicits the narrator’s regret and avocation for all cranes.
The narrator states in the introduction that the philosophers of his time are incorrect to
believe that animals act on mechanical impulses and are inferior to humans. He argues that
animal potential for relationships and emotions equals that of humans: “The parental, and filial
affections seem to be as ardent, their sensibility and attachment, as active and faithful, as those
observed to be in human nature” (lvi-lvii). The excerpts examined in this thesis chapter,
however, make an even larger case: that nonhumans act as subjects that communicate, express
agency, and live interdependently with humans, and they deserve respect as fellow subjects
because humans only imagine that they can control animals. Because the complex and
multifaceted nature of nonhuman subjectivity continues to surprise Americans, the narrator’s
encounters with animals remain relevant to us today; therefore, Travels, and other early
American texts that engage with nonhuman subjectivity, should be examined further.
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CHAPTER FOUR: BEYOND THE OBJECTIFIED SPECTACLE IN THE
TRAVEL DIARY OF ELIZABETH HOUSE TRIST
Contextualizing Trist’s Diary

The roads were so slippery that it made it very dangerous rideing. We concluded to go
about two Mile out of the way to get over. Horses frosted, the cold so intense that I was
allmost dead. We found it impossible to get to the next stage which is 20 miles.
Therefore, hired a guide to conduct us to a good farm house, which was but 10 mile,
where we were inform’d we cou’d be provided with beds . . .
Elizabeth House Trist (209)

In the above excerpt dated January 7, 1784, Elizabeth House Trist records the dangerous
conditions she faced while traveling through Hannas Town on horseback in what was then the
colonial Western Frontier of Pennsylvania (209; Westmoreland County Historical Society). Trist
and her horse overcame snow, ice, and mountainous terrain; shortly after writing this entry she
rested in Pittsburgh, awaiting spring when she could resume her journey to Natchez via flatboat
down the Ohio and Mississippi rivers. The hope of joining her husband, who had moved to
Natchez to manage land investments in British West Florida, motivated Trist during her rough
journey (Kolodny, “Introduction” 184-90). Upon reaching her destination, Trist unfortunately
discovered that her husband had died. Despite this tragic end to her journey, Trist kept the record
of her travels, which was later preserved in archives at the University of Virginia library (19498). First published in 1990, scholars now know this text as The Travel Diary of Elizabeth House
Trist: Philadelphia to Natchez, 1783-84. The Travel Diary is an eighteenth-century American
secular journal, a semi-public document written in the style of an extended letter (Culley 16).
Trist’s primary intended reader was her close friend Thomas Jefferson, whom she left behind in
54

Philadelphia (Kolodny, “Introduction” 186-87). In this thesis chapter, I focus on the overland
entries in the diary and argue that, after one significant and prolonged journey, the narrator’s
interactions with her horse promote an awareness of human animal and nonhuman animal
kinship and a companion species relationship.
Although animals were not the main focus of early American travel literature, Trist’s text
includes many observations about them. Scholars speculate that Trist focused on nature because
her primary audience, Jefferson, was interested in the landscape and resources of the early
American frontier (Kolodny, “Introduction” 185-89). It is also likely, however, that Trist
recorded her observations because she was genuinely interested in natural science. In a letter
before her journey to Natchez, she expressed her wishes to accompany Jefferson on a naturalist
frontier expedition (187). As a secular diarist, Trist acted as a community historian, capturing
snapshots of Euroamerican frontier life and interactions with nonhuman animals (Culley 16).

Discourses of Euroamerican Curiosity

Despite the harsh weather and physical conditions of eighteenth-century travel, Trist used
her journey to contribute to the colonial-American practice of observing and documenting
natural “curiosities.” Susan Scott Parrish explains that while naturalist discourse of this era
characterized nature as an asset, colonial Euroamericans also wrote about curious natural objects
as a strategy for claiming a metropolitan identity: “Colonial men and women used novel or
beautiful specimens of American nature to prove to themselves and to their metropolitan
correspondents that they were not in an uncouth periphery and were not any less astute or curious
than their friends in London” (17). In the late eighteenth century, both male and female colonial
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naturalists were viewed as less legitimate than British naturalists until American men gained
greater acceptance into this community (16-17). Contradictory beliefs that naturalist activities
could be both “fatal” and “improving” to female naturalist practitioners failed to discourage them
from adding their letters, reports, and drawings of American specimens to this transatlantic
conversation (17). As the perceived credibility of American male naturalists increased with the
formation of American philosophical associations and institutions, Parrish argues, participating
in the discourse of “curiosity became more fraught for women” (17). Trist’s diary, written after
this decline in female participation in the naturalist conversation, now stands as an invaluable
artifact of an early British American woman’s relationship with the nonhuman world.
Literary scholars such as Annette Kolodny and Susan Imbarrato note that Trist’s
objectification of nature and the frontier entail describing the landscape and its inhabitants as
captivating spectacles, assets for American development, and curious scientific objects. Kolodny
explains that Trist looked forward to the development of the “wild” frontier into garden cities,
and argues that, like other early American women, Trist saw beauty in raw nature only if it
resembled a domestic garden (The Land Before Her 39-47). Imbarrato further explains that
Trist’s first-person observations provide opportunities to see the early American landscape
through a female settler’s eyes. For Imbarrato, Trist imagines herself as a landlady anticipating
human improvement of the raw “wilderness” (69-76). Imbarrato elaborates on Kolodny’s theory
that men’s attempts to master the frontier further separated them from the environment
(Kolodny, The Lay of the Land 28). Imbarrato extends this idea to Trist’s observations of nature,
which show that she and other settlers viewed the environment in relation to its ability to support
the developing nation. Imbarrato adds that these attitudes were “an unfortunate premonition of
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greater environmental neglect to come” (74). Imbarrato focuses on Trist’s narration of men in a
flatboat killing a pelican to inspect it as a curious object for scientific study (73-74). Imbarrato’s
reading of Trist’s reaction as “curious excitement” mixed with “admiration” for the murdered
pelican illustrates one aspect of early Americans’ relationship with animals; however, neither she
nor Kolodny analyzes Trist’s descriptions of domestic frontier animals in the context of these
encounters (Imbarrato 73). Imbarrato argues that Trist’s desire to catalogue the pelican as a
curious object creates an ideological distance which results in her objectification of the bird (7374). Conversely, her physical closeness with her horse enables connection.

Finding Similar Threads of Animal Subjectivity in Travels and The Travel Diary

Before and during the American Revolution, William Bartram trekked through the
southeastern British-American frontier and gathered the information he would later use to
reconstruct his journey in his post-revolutionary published text Travels (Magee 123-24). Trist,
however, penned her account during her arduous journey from Philadelphia to Natchez, shortly
after the revolution (Kolodny, “Introduction” 184). While their journeys occurred at different
times, both texts were written for post-revolutionary readers and, therefore, capture a similar
moment in early Americans’ relationships with nonhuman animals in the frontier. At this time,
early American naturalists viewed nonhuman nature as valuable resources that, when catalogued,
could support the new American economy (Lewis 69). This view of nature relates to and
succeeds what Parrish describes as British colonial discourse of nature as a collection of assets
(17). Kathryn Napier Gray further explains that early American written accounts of the frontier
as a living landscape presented nature “as a captivating spectacle, which in turn fed
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contemporaneous political and ideological ambitions of colonial expansion and American
independence” (530). Gray says descriptions of nature as a spectacle were an influential factor in
shaping American political ideology that literally moved Euroamericans to dominate the natural
frontier. Although Trist fails to discuss “wild” nonhumans as subjects, the text complicates
written depictions of the natural world because the narration recognizes her horse as a subject.
While Trist’s text reads as a less-conscious effort to explore acknowledgement of animal
subjectivity than Travels does, animal subjectivity still appears in Trist’s diary. While sustained
contact with nonhuman frontier inhabitants changes the narrator’s relationship with them in
Bartram’s Travels, the cold weather and fast pace of Trist’s journey prevented her from making
extended observations of “wild” animals. The harsh weather instead created a situation for Trist
to experience prolonged contact and develop a close bond with her horse. A comparison of
scenes involving unusual birds in Bartram’s and Trist’s texts illustrates my point that close and
prolonged contact between humans and nonhumans is vital before the naturalist observer may
move from objectifying discourse and begin to view animals as subjects. In the case of the
pelican that Imbarrato says Trist objectifies, Trist only briefly observes live pelicans. The first
pelican she comes close to is killed by a man on the flatboat: “There are many Pelican about
here, the first we have seen. They are a fine Majestick looking bird and at a distance resemble the
swan. One of our people kill’d one and brought it on board the boat” (229). As Trist recounts the
close observations of the dead pelican, she makes objective scientific notes but she also tries to
understand how the pelican used its pouch. By contrast, Bartram studied cranes before
confronting a dead one; his previous knowledge allows him to recall how cranes live in
interdependent colonies. Bartram also reflects on his connection with cranes, recalling how
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observing them brings him joy and gives him knowledge to work as a naturalist. Because Trist
has no experience observing live pelicans closely, she can only speculate about how dead
pelicans behave and sees no connection with the bird, which she describes in the language of
curiosity:
They are all white, except the wings which are tinged with black. It measured ten
feet from the tip end of one wing to the other. The Bill is about an inch wide and a
foot in length. . . . I can not comprehend what use they make of this amazing
pouch, unless to scoop up the little fish. They are very harmless and so tame that
they swim allmost in reach of our oars. The most curious bird I ever saw. (229)
Even though she makes scientific observations about the dead pelican, her curiosity comes from
her desire to better comprehend them as living beings. Unlike the narrator in Travels who sees
even a dead sandhill crane as a subject, Trist had never encountered pelicans before this moment.
To her the pelican was sexless, an “it;” whereas Bartram saw the crane he encountered as “he.”
Trist’s physical distance from live pelicans prevents her from bridging the ideological gap;
therefore, Trist is unable to understand pelicans as subjects and can only speak of them with the
language of curiosity. Trist’s depictions of her brief contact with frontier animals portray them as
distant curious objects; however, after prolonged contact with her horse her language about him
gradually recognizes the horse’s subjectivity.

Understanding Her Traveling Companion

In 1704, as Sarah Kemble Knight departed from Boston along rural roads to New Haven,
she observed the silhouette of her guide and his horse: “His shade on his Hors resembled a Globe
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on a Gate post” (Knight 87). Although this image presents a comical view of a larger man on a
horse most likely meant to entertain Knight’s audience, it also shows a human and horse merged
into one entity working together, the post supporting the globe. Here the man is intimately
connected to and dependent upon his horse.13 Similarly, written nearly eighty years later, Trist
uses written expression to acknowledge a similar physical and mental connection with her horse.
Trist’s entries about her horse gradually shift from objectifying descriptions to those that
enable the horse’s agency to emerge. This depiction of the horse as an agent correlates with
discursive traits described by Donna J. Haraway as a companion species relationship. Haraway
explains that companion species bonds can occur wherever nonhuman animal and human animal
lives and bodies intersect, influence, and create each other (When Species Meet 16-17). A
“companion” relationship, as Haraway defines it, goes beyond pet/owner and recognizes all of
the ways that human and nonhuman bodies and minds intertwine to make us human animals. For
example, Haraway argues that this relationship is reciprocal because humans also shape and
influence nonhumans. A companion species relationship entails recognition of other species as
kin; this recognition must be present before interspecies respect is possible:
Looking back in this way takes us to seeing again, to respecere, to the act of
respect. To hold in regard, to respond, to look back reciprocally, to notice, to pay
attention, to have courteous regard for, to esteem: all of that is tied to polite
greeting, to constituting the polis, where and when species meet. (19)
Haraway stresses that acknowledging this intermeshed relationship and participating in
interspecies response fosters respect. The respect that evolves out of this expanded view of
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I thank Lisa Logan for bringing this example to my attention.
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human and nonhuman relationships brings the threads of interconnection into focus: “To knot
companion and species together in encounter, in regard and respect, is to enter the world of
becoming with, where who and what are is precisely what is at stake” (19). That is, a companion
species relationship involves “becoming with” nonhumans—defining who you are and what you
are in a manner that acknowledges and accepts all of the ways nonhumans influence us, make us
possible, and exist as kin. Haraway writes that human and nonhuman relationships constantly
evolve; during the months that Trist was with her horse, their relationship certainly deepened.
Trist’s diary narrates an early instance of the movement towards a contemporary companion
species relationship.
This theoretical angle brings to light where Trist’s narration departs from the dominant
colonial view of domestic animals and verges on escaping dominant ideology by recognizing
how her identity is intermeshed with her horse. When viewing Trist’s narration of her
relationship with her horse through Haraway’s definition of companion species, we see a
silhouette of a city woman on her horse, an image of interdependence as physical and mental
connection, a state of “becoming with.” Haraway elaborates that: “Species interdependence is the
name of the wording game on earth, and that game must be one of response and respect. That is
the play of companion species learning to pay attention. . . . I am who I become with companion
species, who and which make a mess out of categories in the making of kin and kind” (19). As
Trist’s journey progresses, she pays more attention to her horse in diary entries and demonstrates
an increased awareness of this interspecies connection.
As Virginia DeJohn Anderson points out, early Euroamerican farmers were more likely
to view livestock as more than tools, which often led to affection for these nonhumans.
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According to DeJohn Anderson, historical records such as sermons show that seventeenth
century Euroamericans viewed domestic livestock as living possessions that they were
responsible for controlling:
By emphasizing that livestock were living creatures, not just tools to be used and
discarded, this way of thinking also left room for farmers to develop affection
toward the animals entrusted to their care. But by assigning livestock a status
approaching that of servants or even children, as beings to be ruled with a kind
but steady hand, the concept of stewardship muddled the theoretically distinct
categories of human and animal. (93)
In the context of DeJohn Anderson’s theory—that the dominant ideological boundaries that
proclaimed humans and animals as separate beings were less defined between humans and
laboring domestic animals in the seventeenth century—it makes sense, then, that Trist more
readily bonds with her horse than with the “wild” animals she encounters.

Moving Towards Recognition of Intertwinement, Response, and Respect

In the second preserved entry of The Travel Diary, written December 24, 1783, Trist
mentions her traveling party’s horses in a procedural manner that portrays horses as primarily a
means of transportation: “Arose very early with an intention to set off before Breakfast, but it set
in snow very fast which detained us till 10 O’ clock; we rode some distance before we baited
[fed] our Horses, the roads beyond description bad: we cou’d get no further that day than
Elizabeth Town” (201). In this entry, Trist links the group’s ability to travel with their horses’
needs and abilities. Stopping to feed their horses is a normal activity, much like fueling a vehicle
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on a road trip. At this point Trist’s expresses recognition of her horse’s agency, and her ability to
respond to those expressions of agency is limited. Trist’s tone and detail merely acknowledge
that humans are linked to their horses in order to maintain their identities as travelers, a rather
shallow connection when compared to a companion species relationship, which involves
acknowledging the many complex ways that humans and nonhumans are connected, respond to
each other, and enable each other’s identities. Haraway contends that this failure to recognize
interspecies intertwinement makes it difficult for humans to respond to, respect, and
acknowledge nonhumans as kin (When Species Meet 19). Because of the manner in which the
diary begins, Trist’s eventual recognition of the deeper ways that her horse enables her identity
marks a significant move towards a companion species relationship.
Trist’s movement towards recognition of interdependence first occurs five days into her
journey in the December 30, 1783 entry. Despite her desire to continue and find nicer lodgings,
she acknowledges that her traveling schedule depends on her horse’s physical wellness. Even
though her party disapproves of the accommodations available, they are forced to stop to feed
and rest the horses: “we were obliged to push on for want of a place to stop that was fit for a
christian. At one House we stayed to feed our horses, the family was large—a good farm and a
Mill, the buildings good; but every thing was so dirty that I would rather have slept out of doors”
(204). Although Trist disapproves of the lodging, she sees that her horse is hungry and tired.
While her record of feeding the horse implies that she sees him as a vehicle for travel, she also
sees that at least in one respect they depend upon each other. The conditions undesirable to
humans enable Trist to see that in this case his needs supersede hers.
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The presentation of horses and humans as interdependent species is not limited to Trist
and her horse. During a stop in one recently settled frontier location Trist’s elderly hostess, who
was “upwards of eighty,” brags that “she coul’d ride a 100 miles in one day without being
fatigued if she cou’d get a horse that wou’d carry so far” (204). The woman’s ability to skillfully
connect with her horse is narrated as a mark of pride on a frontier where riding long distances
was necessary. This woman describes her horsemanship, in effect constructing her identity in
relation to a horse. Trist finds this woman’s ability to travel great distances on a horse significant
enough to record in her diary. Perhaps this anecdote was included because Trist related to the
woman’s experience with her horse; she too imagined constructing her identity as a companion
to a horse.
As the freezing conditions on the trail worsen, Trist evinces an even greater connection to
her traveling companion. She knows that he enables her survival in these harsh conditions and
records how he carried her through waist-high snow that nearly blocked the only path up a
mountain: “the Snow up to the Horses bellies. . . . Had I dismounted, I believe I must have
Perished for I cou’d not have mounted again” (204-05). Here, Trist’s identity as a human traveler
relies upon her horse. She explains how the horse enabled her survival: “I am certain I cou’d not
have walk’d 2 or 3 miles through the snow” (205). During the trek up the snow-covered
mountain she also remarks that she has to hold onto the horse’s mane so that she does not fall out
of her saddle during a steep incline: the terrain is “allmost perpendicular, and our saddles slip’d
so that we cou’d scarcely keep our selves on by holding the main” (205). Close contact with her
horse is essential to her survival. The image of Trist, fingers entwined in the horse’s mane and
holding on for her life, illustrates the human-horse bond generated by eighteenth-century frontier
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travel. Instead of a human rider perched atop a horse, this passage features a different
silhouette—one with the rider’s body pressed close to the horse—both species working together
for survival. Trist’s decision to describe her horse’s presence as life-saving marks a shift from
understanding the horse as a means of transportation to recognizing her dependence upon him for
survival. The rough traveling conditions deepen Trist’s relationship with her horse and her
account of him as a respected companion.
Trist gradually sees the horse as part of her own physical ability and identity. After weeks
of traveling with him, she mentions that she senses his emotions. Her sensitivity signals the
presence of another key aspect of a companion species relationship—listening to and responding
to other species with respect. An excerpt from January 8, 1784 stands out for Trist’s increased
sensitivity and response to her horse’s needs and nonverbal communication. On January 6, 1784,
Trist attributes her composed demeanor during the difficult travel conditions to her riding skills:
“The small runs as well as creeks were all most impassible. The Horses were frequently near
swimming. Notwithstanding, I did not feel much intimidated but plunged through with no other
mishap than getting wet; the roads very bad. . . . Mr. Fowler gave me credit for my good
Horsemanship” (208). Two days later, however, Trist senses her horse’s fear and responds
empathetically with concern for both horse and rider:
I cou’d not get my Horse out of a walk, and every step his feet allmost sliping
from under him, at last down we came; but lucky enough to receive no damage.
Only it made his cowardice increase and added nothing to my courage. Poor
beast, he trembled every step he took after that. Night came on and, for the first
time since I left home, my Spirits forsook me. (210)
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The difference between the two situations is that in the January 8 excerpt Trist senses that her
horse is scared. While in the first entry Trist’s confidence is bolstered by her increased skill, her
sensitivity to her horse in the second entry illustrates her evolving connection with him during
the hazardous journey. Trist and her horse are so intimately connected that she loses courage
only when her horse becomes fearful: “his cowardice increase[d] and added nothing to my
courage” (210). Trist reads her horse’s nonverbal communication, his shaking, as fear. After her
horse falls, she senses his trembling and feels sorry for him, lamenting that he is a “Poor beast”
(210). Calling her horse a “Poor beast” may initially seem an uncompassionate expression to a
modern reader. In the context of Trist’s greater connection with her horse and ability to sense his
emotions, however, this phrase indicates an empathetic response. This comparison of these two
passages, therefore, shows another advance in Trist’s evolving relationship with her horse—
movement towards a companion species bond with her horse.

Comparing Companion Intimacy: the Horse, Fawnis, and Polly
The significance of Trist’s frequent diary entries about her horse and their increasing
bond comes into full view when compared to how she describes her female traveling companion
Polly and her small dog Fawnis. While Trist never names her steed outright, she still comes to
write about him as a companion to whom her identity and emotions are linked. She writes about
her dependence upon him; she understands his nonverbal utterances enough to read his emotions.
Because of these connections, a relationship with compassion and respect becomes possible by
the end of the journey. At a first reading, Trist’s horse might appear as an absent figure, hidden
behind his labor as a source of transportation; however, a closer look through the contemporary
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lens of a companion species relationship makes Trist’s greater bond with him visible. This bond
also results in an increase in the horse’s ability to express himself and break through Trist’s
narration. Specifically, the moment of connection that allows readers to hear the horse as a
character is the aforementioned passage when Trist describes her horse’s fall and resulting fear
on the frozen trail: “Only it made his cowardice increase and added nothing to my courage. Poor
beast, he trembled every step he took after that” (210). In addition to Trist’s expression of
connection, in this moment Trist also narrates the horse’s feelings and experiences during this
leg of the journey, bringing him into focus as more than an element of scenery. The horse’s fear
makes visible his own needs and emotions.
The emotional needs and state of Fawnis and Polly, however, cannot be deciphered from
Trist’s encounters with them. Trist mentions Fawnis only to mark his mysterious disappearance
during a stop to rest from traveling on a flatboat down the Yasow river: “We stopped at an Island
for the night, and I lost my poor little Dog, Fawnis. Tis supposed the Allegator got him as one
was seen swimming about the boat in the evening—poor little fellow” (230). Kolodny speculates
in a footnote that Trist most likely acquired her dog during a stop as a gift (230). While Trist
does express sadness for the loss of her “poor little fellow,” she never describes him as part of
her identity, never records sensing his emotions, nor writes about him in any other surviving
entry. As animal companions go, Trist’s descriptions of her horse indicate a growing
relationship, while this lone excerpt about her dog merely records his disappearance and Trist’s
sadness at his fate.
Trist similarly neglects to mention her human companion—a young girl named Polly,
who accompanies Trist as a companion from Philadelphia for the entire journey—in any
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expressly emotional capacity in her diary. Scholars have yet to decode Polly’s relationship to
Trist; was she a servant, a neighbor, a distant relative? Kolodny describes her as “a female
companion known only as Polly” (“Introduction” 188). Trist mentions Polly mostly as a woman
to share a bed with on their journey; in this capacity Polly helps Trist to maintain a public display
of virtue. Without Polly, this journey would have been a compromising situation for a lone
woman traveling the eighteenth-century British-American frontier. On January 1, 1784, Trist
describes the lodging conditions when they stop for the night in Juniata, Pennsylvania: “The one
[bed] occupied by Polly and my self was up in a dark corner surrounded by pickling tubs which
did not yield the most agreeable smell in the world; the other by Mr. Fowler and a Lawyer
Hamilton” (205). In this entry, Trist makes it clear that she and Polly slept together while the
men they were traveling with slept in another bed, their privacy secured by pickling tubs. Six
days later, Trist mentions Polly again when they stop at a farm for the night. Again, Polly’s
presence establishes Trist’s propriety—they sleep in one room with “Six or 7 men” (209). The
entry records Polly’s spot beside Trist and their joint efforts to change clothes behind a curtain:
“Old Mr. Waltowers and Mr. Irwin had one of the beds, Polly and myself the other—but we
found no difficulty in being private, having good worsted curtains round the bed. We allways
made it practise to dress and undress behind the curtain” (209). Polly receives no further mention
until May 27, 1784, when they share an “old log hut” and “spread [their] beds at night and, in the
Morning by rolling them up, they serve as seats” (218). Trist makes it clear that she and Polly
sleep away from male travelers and even relates how they domesticate the hut by using beds as
seats and a barrel as a table.
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When the traveling party encounters rough conditions the next day, Trist mentions Polly
only to note Polly’s horse’s emotional state: “Polly’s Horse being in better Spirits than mine, she
push’d on” (210). Interestingly, Trist records the horse’s good emotional state but fails to explain
if Polly was bothered by the icy weather, although she does note when Polly comes down with a
fever. Each of these examples show that Polly helps Trist to maintain propriety along the
“uncivilized” frontier and that Polly garners less mention in the diary than Trist’s horse. Trist’s
relationships with Polly and Fawnis fail to evolve in the journal as her relationship with her horse
does, suggesting that she considers the growing companion bond with her horse remarkable and
worth sharing with fellow naturalist Jefferson. This ecofeminist/human-animal studies approach,
therefore, allows The Travel Diary to be read, in part, as Trist’s account of her growing
companion species bond with her horse.
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CHAPTER FIVE: WHEN THE PAST INFLUENCES THE FUTURE: A
BRIEF MEDITATION
A Spectrum of Human and Nonhuman Relations

This project reveals that Fabulous Histories, Travels, and The Travel Diary present
narratives that resist objectifying animals. None of these texts wholly endorse the human/animal
hierarchy, nor do they completely break from it. The best way to visualize this relationship is by
arranging the texts along a spectrum as in Figure 1:

Figure 1: Spectrum of Human and Nonhuman Relations

Texts at the left extreme of this spectrum, without exception, endorse the human/animal binary
and hierarchical relationships, such as those promoted by hierarchies in Enlightenment thought.
Texts at the extreme right of the spectrum feature heterarchical relationships (such as Haraway’s
companion species bond), in which the interdependence and diversity of species is recognized as
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necessary for survival, and nonhumans are treated with respect. Any movement to the right along
this spectrum is also movement toward more sustainable human and nonhuman relationships.
In the context of the spectrum in Figure 1, Fabulous Histories advocates for compassion
towards animals and speaks against keeping nonhumans in cages for amusement or as preserved
curiosities. These qualities keep Fabulous Histories from the extreme left end of the spectrum,
despite its constant statements that animals are inferior beings. Travels is placed further to the
right because the narrator repeatedly moves from a scientific, objectifying tone towards “wild”
nonhumans to seeing them as communicative beings who express agency. The Travel Diary
features Trist’s gradual movement toward a companion species bond with her horse. This text is
to the right of Travels because Trist acknowledges a bodily and emotional connection with her
horse that allows her to read his emotions—she sees how their interdependence shapes and
enables progress and survival during their arduous journey. That being said, Bartram, does
reflect on how cranes bring him joy and partly enable his work as a naturalist. Trist’s bond with
her horse, however, is one of two creatures working together for survival. While Trist does sense
her horse’s emotions at the end of her diary, Bartram sees various frontier animals as speaking
subjects. An argument could therefore be made to switch the placement of Trist’s and Bartram’s
texts along the spectrum for different reasons. Both texts, however, still make more progress
towards sustainable relationships with nonhumans than Fabulous Histories.
My thesis opens the door to further examine the connections among human relationships
with animals in early America and the discourses of sympathy, understanding, science, nature,
and respect. Advocacy and compassion for animals may only advance a relationship to a certain
point; without recognition of nonhuman subjectivity, humans may continue to overlook the ways
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species exist interdependently and justify overlooking the abuse of nonhumans by claiming they
are less-than-human. Acknowledging nonhuman subjectivity, therefore, acts as a threshold that
must be crossed to advance beyond a relationship in which nonhumans are inferior beings that
should be cared for because humans, as a superior species, are responsible for them. In early
America, as in contemporary America, examples of nonhuman communication, emotions,
interspecies dependence, and agency continue to shock humans. Similar explorations of early
American texts would therefore prove productive because they reveal something about the
origins of our contemporary denial of nonhuman subjectivity.

The Nineteenth Century Brings More Vocal Animal Advocacy

Sentimentality, kindness and avocation for the welfare of animals persisted as minority
discourses in the United States. In 1866, for example, people questioned the establishment of
The Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals. In various magazine articles writers
accused the organization and its president of unnecessary sentimentality towards animals. New
York enacted several state laws that outlined rules for transporting livestock by railroad,
outlawed fighting animals with each other or humans, and made it a misdemeanor to harm or
neglect any animal belonging to a human (“Cruelty to Animals”). While these laws set
protections in place for animals, including “any horse, mule, ox, cattle, sheep, or other animal,
belonging to [a human],” they failed to protect nondomestic animals (“Cruelty to Animals”).
Also, the SPCA faced challenges from the media and individual Americans. In a letter to the
editor of The Galaxy, on June, 15 1866, the president of the SPCA, Henry Bergh, addressed the
editor’s accusations that the creation of an animal welfare society was unnecessary:
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[Y]ou are pleased to say, that this Society is the least needed of all reforms. You
will pardon me for saying that I think the article alluded to was written without
due reflection. Is no reform needed in the carrying of cattle by railroads thousands
of miles, without allowing them rest, or food, or water for four and five days at a
time? (“Article 3” 365)
The Galaxy editor replies that he approves of the reforms but disapproves of the creation of a
society to oversee them. The editor points out Bergh’s sympathy for animals and says that The
Galaxy employees privately empathize: “As to the cattle, the beeves and calves, sheep and
lambs, and the unnecessary and injurious suffering that they undergo at the hands of butchers and
drovers, Mr. Bergh’s sensibilities, official though they are, cannot be more tender, more easily
wounded than those of our humble and private self” (365). The editor’s tone seems sarcastic
even as he says he possesses tender sensibilities.
Whether this editor’s response was a direct attack on Bergh because he sympathizes with
animals or not, an article from November 3, 1866, titled “Another Anti-cruelty Society Needed”
directly attacks the society’s sympathy for animals: “the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty is
appealing to public sympathy in behalf of the animals. In fact, there is every certainty that no
effort will be made to imbue them with a proper sense of gratitude” (220). This satire of the
SPCA continues with descriptions of mewling cats disrupting human sleep, ants and roaches
ruining pastries, and moths destroying clothes; it concludes by calling for a society where
animals advocate for other animals to be kind to humans, “a zoologico-benevolent society, which
should educate and send forth missionary bugs and beasts of every species for the conversion of
their unenlightened brethren . . . to be known as the Cosmopolitan Society for the Prevention
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among Animals of Cruelty to Men” (220). Clearly animal welfare existed as a contested subject
in the nineteenth century; at least the presence of the SPCA indicates a more direct and vocal
avocation than in Trimmer’s, Bartram’s and Trist’s eighteenth-century texts. While post-bellum,
nineteenth-century antisentimental thought partly influenced the negative reception of the SPCA,
the eighteenth-century discourse of sympathy played a role in how humans related to and
advocated for nonhumans. As sympathy was significant during and immediately after the
American Revolution, examining its impact on human and nonhuman relations adds another
significant dimension to the reading of these texts. One direction for future research is to layer
the discourse of sympathy onto a human-animal/ecofeminist framework to decode human and
nonhuman interactions in Trist’s, Bartram’s, Trimmer’s, and other early American texts.

Connecting with Nonhuman Subjects in Contemporary America

Scholars across many fields have begun to unravel the myth of human superiority and
separation from animals, including Carol J. Adams, Jacques Derrida, Donna Haraway, and Cary
Wolfe). As Murphy explains, all living beings are interdependent and interanimated—growing
together and learning from each other (Literature, Nature, and Other 21-23). Therefore, even the
smallest waves of influence can impact all other beings because we exist in these interdependent
relationships. Too often, contemporary American relationships with nonhumans exist to the left
of the “acknowledging subjectivity” threshold (see Figure 1). Reimagining ways for humans to
acknowledge humanimality is a challenging project with infinite possibilities that I hope many
scholars will take up. Once fully realized, this project will fundamentally change our thinking for
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the better. For now, this small disturbance is a ripple in what I hope will be a wave of rethinking
early American texts with ecocritical and human-animal studies lenses.
Where can we look for vital moments of connection such as those Trist and Bartram
recount? We spend our lives connected via multimedia devices and disconnected from
nonhuman nature. Immersed in a digital world of noise, images, and human-centric ideas, these
simulacra separate us from the physical world where we encounter and bond with animals. The
further we remove ourselves physically and mentally from our nonhuman kin, the easier it
becomes to forget that we share this connection and that human decisions based on “the good of
humanity” can harm all beings.
For Bartram and Trist, animal bonding happened “out” in nature; Trimmer discussed the
pleasures of observing animals in nature as opposed to collecting and caging them. But what if
nature is not “out there” but everywhere? Each daily encounter is a moment to rekindle our
connection to nonhuman kin. Perhaps it is as simple as observing a spider spin her web in the
morning light of your kitchen windowsill and imagining how she sees the world. The spider does
not see herself as an invader, as less-than-human, or as a pest. She moves about the world with
her own thoughts, emotions, and purpose—all of which are always already intimately connected
to our own movement through the world. The sooner all human animals envision their
connection to nonhumans the sooner the quality of all life will improve. These connections
cannot be made, however, unless human animals take the effort to encounter, listen to, respect
and try to understand our nonhuman kin.
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